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The end of the Orientalist critique

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American cultural identity in the wake of September 11

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Economist Paul Romer on a limitless human future

Guarding the Home Front
Will civil liberties be a casualty in the War on Terrorism?

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A Father's Advice



If a sportsman true you'd be
Listen carefully to me...

Never, never let your gun
Pointed be at anyone.
That it may unloaded be
Matters not the least to me.

When a hedge or fence you cross
Though of time it cause a loss
From your gun the cartridge take
For the greater safety's sake.

If twixt you and neighboring gun
Bird shall fly or beast may run
Let this maxim ere be thine
"Follow not across the line."

Stops and beaters oft unseen
Lurk behind some leafy screen.
Calm and steady always be
"Never shoot where you can't see."

You may kill or you may miss
But at all times think of this:
"All the pheasants ever bred
Won't repay for one man dead."

Written by Mark Beaufoy of Coombe House, Shaftsbury, Dorset, England, in 1902, on presenting his eldest son, Henry Mark, with his first gun. Reproduction here by permission of the author's granddaughter, Mrs. P.M. Guild.

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"The illegal drug trade is the financial engine that fuels many terrorist organizations around the world, including Osama Bin Laden."

House Speaker Dennis Hastert[1]



- The United Nations reports an illegal drug trade worth $400 Billion a year[2] — $100 Billion more than our Department of Defense budget.
- Drug trade is big business: Illegal Drugs are 8% of all international trade while Textiles are 7.5% and Motor Vehicles are 5.3%.[3]

We do not purport a direct link with the tragedies of 9/11. But as part of the battle to defeat terrorism and strengthen our society, ask yourself:

- Is the funding of terrorism another unintended consequence of drug prohibition?
- Could a regulated and controlled model for soft drugs similar to our approach with alcohol and for hard drugs similar to prescription drugs stop the flow of illegal drug profits?
- In so many ways, does the War on Drugs cause far more harm than good, both here and abroad?

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Sources:
1: Associated Press, "Hastert Forms Task Force on Drugs," September 21, 2001.
2: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, "Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking" (New York, NY: UN Drug Control Program, 1998), p. 3.
3: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, "Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking" (New York, NY: UN Drug Control Program, 1998), p. 3.

Editor's Note

"The World Trade Center should...because of its importance, become a living representation of man's belief in humanity, his need for individual dignity, his belief in the cooperation of men, and through this cooperation his ability to find greatness."
—World Trade Center architect Minoru Yamasaki (1912–1987)

I FLEW INTO NEW YORK a couple of weeks after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For the length of the short flight from Cincinnati, my anxiety about flying so soon after the September 11 hijackings was overwhelmed by my dread of the moment that I knew would come just minutes before landing in LaGuardia airport.

It was a brilliantly clear morning, not unlike the day of the attacks, a virtually cloudless blue sky. After flying across New Jersey and Staten Island, the plane cruised over Brooklyn and then banked up the East River, giving me and the few other passengers onboard an appallingly postcard-perfect view of the irreparably altered Manhattan skyline. From the sky, no trace of the Twin Towers—those gargantuan cathedrals of commerce—was visible, except for a few whisps of smoke that slowly faded into nothingness. Amid the muffled, horrified gasps from fellow passengers on the plane, I heard one murmur, "It's gone. It's really all gone."

Weeks after the attacks, it's still impossible to tally up all the losses, both literal and figurative. Certainly, more than the World Trade Center was destroyed in September, more was damaged than the Pentagon—more was lost even than thousands of innocent lives. A decade after the end of the Cold War, a decade after many in the West had declared the universal triumph of liberal democracy, we have been brutally reinserted back into history, into deep-seated ideological and violent conflict. It is far from clear how events will play out, or what the final toll will be.

Many of the stories in this issue of **reason** try to take the measure of this grim new reality. Domestically, there is cause for concern beyond more terrorist strikes: Members of the Bush administration and Congress have already lectured the press on the need for self-censorship, and some news organizations have altered their coverage in response to such pleas. Our cover story, "Guarding the Home Front" (see page 34), surveys a panel of experts on which civil liberties are most at risk as the U.S. prosecutes the War on Terrorism; in "Liberty's Paradoxes" (see page 25), Contributing Editor Cathy Young asks provocatively whether we must give up some freedom now to secure our way of life for the longer term. In "2001 Nights" (see page 62), Senior Editor Charles Paul Freund analyzes "the Orientalist critique," which holds that the West has systematically conceptualized the Middle East as barbaric and subhuman, and raises the unexamined issue of Islamic "Occidentalism." My own essay, "The New Cold War" (see page 71) suggests that the nation's cultural identity in the wake of the attacks is changing in ways that confound both the right and the left.

Regular readers of **reason** have already noticed that they are holding a radically different-looking magazine in their hands. Needless to say, I had hoped to unveil our first full-scale graphic redesign in close to a decade in better times. The new look is the result of a year's collaboration with Louis Rossetto, who provided invaluable assistance, including hooking us up with designers Erik Spiekermann and Susanna Dulkinys. I'd like to thank them—and all our readers who contributed financially to the redesign—for their efforts. I look forward to your responses.

Nick Gillespie

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Jesse Walker

"I hope I never grow to be as mean-spirited as TIM CAVANAUGH," one reader wrote after enduring a recent Cavanaugh article in the Online Journalism Review (www.ojr.org). In this month's Rant, the San Francisco writer argues that the age of suicide hijackers, anthrax attacks, and carpet-bombing of Stone Age central Asian countries is not, as many pious commentators have claimed, inevitably making the world a more caring and sincere place. (See "Ironic Engagement," page 31.) Cavanaugh was the editor of the late, lamented satiric Web site Suck.com, and has written widely for newspapers and magazines, including the *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Wired*, and *Business 2.0*.

History has long classified World War I as the senseless consequence of entangled alliances. **reason** Contributing Editor BRINK LINDSEY refines that notion in "The Decline and Fall of the First Global Economy." (See page 42.) Lindsey, director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, focuses on how the rise of collectivist ideas fed the nationalism and militarism that motivated those alliances. As important, he sees "the last, pathetic remnant of that collectivism in today's Luddite left"—and in its woeful misreading of globalization's past. His book, *Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism*, will be published by John Wiley & Sons in December.

No one better understands the erosion of radio's eccentric charms than **reason** Associate Editor JESSE WALKER, author of *Rebels on the Air: An Alternative History of Radio in America* (NYU Press). An excerpt from the book, which began life as a 1995 **reason** article, begins on page 67. (See "Free Your Radio.") A former college and community radio DJ, Walker is quick to diagnose what's lacking on the airwaves today: "Most stations can't imagine what the Velvet Underground might have in common with Hank Williams Jr., and would never dream of playing them in the same set." Walker also subjects historian Ronald Radosh's controversial memoir, *Commies*, to a withering cross-examination. (See "Lobotomies, Socialist and Capitalist," page 77.)

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
BEYOND MIRAMAX: THE WORLD OF TRULY INDEPENDENT FILM
REASON
SCHOOLHOUSE CROCK
Why George W. Bush's education reforms won't work
By Lisa Snell
THE ROOTS OF RACIAL PROFILING
By Gene Callahan and William Anderson
SEX & THE CENSUS
By Cathy Young

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Schoolhouse Crock

I just read Lisa Snell's article about my brother's plan to improve public education ("Schoolhouse Crock," August/September). While she made some important points, I do think she discounted the trials and tribulations of being in the arena, trying to make reforms against significant opposition. I did not see in the article any realistic alternatives to his proposal or what we are trying to do here in Florida.

Our accountability efforts have yielded rising student achievement across the board with even better results in the lower performing schools. In Florida, we also allow for vouchers for all ESE [special ed] students. Next school year, a corporate tax credit will allow low-income parents to send their kids to private schools. Each incremental reform creates the opportunity for another one. If Snell has a realistic alternative, this governor would love to learn about it.

Gov. Jeb Bush
Tallahassee, FL

One need not be a Pollyanna to see optimistic signs to balance Lisa Snell's well-crafted cover story on why federal dollars can't buy true school reform any more than true love.

First, tiny though it may be now, the new Title I provision allowing families in failing public schools to purchase private tutoring services does establish a beachhead for expanded private choice.

Moreover, while lobbyists for the education monopoly were gunning for Title I vouchers, President Bush quietly used the tax bill to advance the principle that families should be free to direct their education dollars as they see fit. The expansion of tax-sheltered Education Savings Accounts to K–12 wipes out the monopoly's irrational contention that tax breaks should be reserved for students fortunate enough to go to college.

Finally, the Bush administration's biggest boost for school reform may have come in Solicitor General Ted Olson's call for the U.S. Supreme Court to use the Cleveland case to uphold the constitutionality of free-choice vouchers. If vouchers are sustained by the nation's highest court, that will open the door to hundreds of locally devised initiatives, such as Louisiana's plan to aid 600 poor New Orleans preschoolers in enrolling in parochial schools this fall. And, after all, that's where true reform must blossom—at the grassroots.

Robert Holland
Lexington Institute
Arlington, VA

We live in the "highly regarded" suburban school district of Plano, Texas, where over 90 percent of all students passed all the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) tests last year. We have 40 "exemplary" campuses and 21 Blue Ribbon schools, myriad awards, and a reputation that brings thousands to town every year because of the "quality" of the education.

Imagine my surprise when I found out achievement at my daughter's elementary school and the district in general wasn't all it was cracked up to be. According to the Just For the Kids Foundation (www.Just4kids.org), while 93 percent of third graders managed to "pass" the mathematics TAAS in 1999, only 44 percent managed a higher "profi-

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

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cient" standard determined by the foundation. That led me to look into just exactly what it means to "pass" the TAAS. A few years ago a third grader had to answer about 75 percent of the questions correctly in order to pass. Now it is closer to 50 percent of the questions.

I am dismayed when news reports show record numbers of parents giving their public schools terrific ratings. Why? We can't even teach our children to multiply! Change will not occur as long as school districts and state education departments and even the Department of Education are allowed to send out what amounts to propaganda about student achievement without being challenged.

Susan Sarhady
Plano, TX

Just because Lisa Snell's son is attending a school with sub-par reading scores doesn't mean he has to be a sub-par reader. Parents, not the school system or the government, are ultimately responsible for their children's education.

Snell is right in saying that the president's plan is doomed to failure. But not for the reasons she cites. This new plan will fail for precisely the same reason all the previous plans failed: because there is nothing the federal government can do to substantially improve the nation's schools—except, perhaps, get out of their way. Our poor schools are not so much a sickness themselves as they are a symptom of the greater epidemic: Individuals don't want to take any responsibility. Parents won't take responsibility for what their children learn (much less what they do); they expect the schools to take care of that. And communities won't take responsibility for their failing schools. That's government's job, isn't it?

Rob Jenkins
Lawrenceville, GA

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While at my children's school registration, I had to complete an Emergency Contact Form. I noticed that, for the first time, it has a spot for cell phones.

My peers in the mortgage processing business have been busy reformatting interest rate calculations, reports, and systems to translate between American currency and European currency. Meanwhile, my kid's school just made a leap to acknowledge cell phones—kind of. You see, the fifth grade teacher said she thought cell phone use was a sign of self-importance. This is the person preparing my child to join the global economy 10 years from now?

Lynne Sommer
Jacksonville, FL

To Lisa Snell, it seems that choice in schooling can only exist if government provides it. After complaining that her local government schools are low-performing (surprise, socialism doesn't work), she complains that her "only options are relocation, home schooling, or...investment of a small fortune in private school tuition."

This sounds like a fine set of choices. In reality, Snell's complaint is that the improvement in her child's education from one of these alternatives is not worth the cost to obtain it. She wishes the state would reduce the cost/benefit gap with a voucher. The voucher movement is not talking about choice per se, but government subsidized choice. As Snell implicitly

acknowledges, the market is already providing school choice. In most locations there are numerous private school options and they don't all cost "a small fortune." In the Raleigh, N.C., area, for example, tuition ranges from $2,000 to $10,000 a year. Even in the relatively expensive suburban Washington, D.C., area, there are private schools with tuition as low as $4,000 to $5,000. Parents often pay more than this for pre-school or daycare.

If parents don't think their children's education is worth the cost associated with private or home schooling, then the government already provides them with one cheap out—that's more than enough.

Roy Cordato
Angier, NC

Lisa Snell replies: While I applaud the incremental reforms that Gov. Bush has implemented in Florida, politicians discount the trials and tribulations of parents who actually have to enroll their children in failing schools.

As for a realistic alternative, give parents the right to exit to a better-performing public school. Open enrollment between public schools should not be optional.

Robert Holland is right—for a few lucky parents, there are a few more modest choices. If the Supreme Court rules in favor of vouchers, there should be more grassroots school-choice experiments.

I identify and sympathize with Susan Sarhady and Lynne Sommer. Yes, these are the people preparing our children for the global economy. Rob Jenkins is right on target, but until you give parents the opportunity to exit the public schools in a cost-effective manner, most parents will continue to shrug off the responsibility for their children's education.

Finally, Roy Cordato is partly right. The three choices are a "fine set of choices" for some parents. My son Jacob is enrolled in a small high-quality private school. I can afford to pay twice. Too bad all the other El Cerrito Elementary school parents cannot afford to pay twice and leave the school and its 36th percentile reading scores.

Criminal Profiling

Gene Callahan and William Anderson's otherwise excellent article, "The Roots of Racial Profiling" (August/September), failed to expose the role of race in America's first drug laws. Drug war apologists typically describe the disproportionate impact on minorities as "unintended consequences." That's not entirely true. The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 was preceded by a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment. Opium was identified with Chinese laborers, marijuana with Mexicans, and cocaine with African-Americans.

There is a strong case to be made for the argument that America's drug laws were once intended as a means of disenfranchising minorities.

A review of the testimony that led to the passage of early drug laws like the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 reveals a racist intent on the part of many politicians. Keep in mind that Jim Crow was very much alive in the early 20th century. Racial profiling was both expected and encouraged by the white majority.

Granted, modern day drug warriors are (hopefully) not out to incarcerate as many minorities as possible. Nonetheless, the racist intent on the part of early drug warriors is very much relevant to today's outcomes.

The drug war has evolved into an intergenerational culture war. Members of the '60s counterculture are all grown up, and now youth rave culture is the latest target. It's not health outcomes that determine America's Draconian drug laws, but rather cultural norms.

Robert Sharpe
The Lindesmith Center–Drug Policy Foundation
Washington, DC

"The Roots of Racial Profiling" reminded me of an experience I had in 1994, while in college. As a white man living in Cornhill, a nearly exclusively black, crime-ridden neighborhood in the throes of the crack epidemic, in Utica, N.Y., I was headed out my driveway on a weekend night to my job in a convenience store. A police car's lights flashed as I pulled onto the street.

The officer, who was black, came up and asked me for my license and asked a few questions. The last two stood out. He asked why I looked familiar and I told him it was because I give him coffee, wherein he recognized me from the store where I worked. The second was whether I knew why I had been pulled over, to which I replied I did not. He said, "Well, we don't get too many white boys down here this time of night."

It was a few days before it hit me I had been pulled over because of the color of my skin, and years before I heard the term "racial profiling." But one thing was clear: This officer was completely professional and honest, and he was no racist, the conventional wisdom be damned.

In a neighborhood rife with mur-

der, crack whores, and gunfire, that officer was merely playing the odds that after dark a white person was even money for picking up a hooker, buying drugs, or otherwise breaking the law. I appreciated that he wanted to clean up the area.

And as Cincinnati residents found out, he could have taken a nap instead, rather than take the chance that some self-righteous international studies student would call the American Civil Liberties Union whining about rights.

Greg Smith
Chazy, NY

Drawing Fire

I found it interesting that in "The Great Gun Fight" between Robert Ehrlich and John Lott Jr. (August/September), evidence from other countries was never considered by either side. I understand that the incidence of gun-related crime in countries such as Britain and Canada is a fraction of that in the U.S., presumably due to gun control. Control of hand guns limits the number of guns available to criminals, whether acquired through purchase or theft. And don't most shootings occur between people who know each other? Surely gun control would limit this.

John Lott poses a hypothetical in which a mass murderer starts shooting people at random and several bystanders pull out their guns. In such a scenario, we have to hope three things to be true: (1) the bystanders have enough skill to hit what they aim at; (2) the bystanders can accurately identify the bad guy/girl and not target each other; and (3) the police, when they arrive, know whom to shoot.

Godfried Pimlott
Victoria, British Columbia
Canada

Robert Ehrlich believes that deterrence is ineffective for mass murderers because "these psychos" would "relish the idea of going out in a blaze of glory." He cites the prevalence of "suicide by police" to bolster his contention.

However, suicide by cop is easily distinguishable from "suicide by armed citizen." The former occurs after the killer has accomplished his self-assigned mission; the latter is either mid-massacre or, with luck, before innocent life is lost. Hypermotivated killers may not fear death, but they do fear failure. By increasing the probability of failure and bringing a swift end to any incidents that occur, armed citizens perform a double service to their communities.

Still, I doubt that right-to-carry laws have much direct impact on aggregate crime rates. Most predators are reckless opportunists. The critical metrics are probably the proportion of armed to unarmed citizens, and the likelihood of apprehension.

But this is academic. The bottom line is the individual's right to be armed. If our leaders really wanted to cut crime, they would legalize drugs. This would gut crime syndicates, greatly reduce robbery and theft, and totally eliminate over a third of all current arrests in one fell swoop. There would be no need for statistical chicanery to tease out the results.

Ken Lynch
Huntsville, TX

Imperial Poverty

L.E. Birdzell Jr. may or may not be right about why Third World countries are poor ("How the East Grew Poor," August/September). But in his haste to debunk Mike Davis' theory on that subject, he neglected to mention a central theme of *Late Victorian Holocausts*, a theme which is also central to the work of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen: During famines, there is nearly always enough food in a country to prevent anyone from starving.

The starvation of tens of millions of people in India during famines under British rule was partly caused by adherence to laissez-faire ideology. The comparison to the horror of Mao's Great Leap Forward is entirely appropriate. Even Robert Nozick in his libertarian days held to a Lockean proviso that human life takes precedence over property rights in times of emergency.

Donald Johnson
Nyack, NY

L.E. Birdzell Jr. replies: I offer three observations. First, it is commonplace that crop failure is often local or regional, so that food may be in surplus in close geographical or political proximity to starvation. But where relief food can best be procured is immaterial to the government's basic responsibility. For the many famines, from North Korea to the Horn of Africa, where relief food has been imported, government obstructionism has been neither more nor

reason News

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less reprehensible than in famines where food might have been procured locally.

Second, laissez-faire "ideology" taught reduced government interference in market exchange. Gifts of food to starving people without money to pay for it are not exchange transactions and encountered no effective ideological opposition, laissez faire or other. Though Britain repeatedly acknowledged government responsibility for famine relief, it failed in the funding. Its inadequacy of funding is amply explained by political traditions much older than, and entirely unrelated to, laissez faire.

Finally, nobody questions the emergency powers of government to requisition or destroy property to save lives. However, the circumstances where their exercise would be appropriate need not arise in a famine unless the government has failed its primary responsibilities.

Southern Redemption

I have noted Charles Oliver's review of *When in the Course of Human Events: Arguing the Case for Southern Secession,* my book on the Civil War ("Southern Nationalism," August/September). In the interest of fairness to your readers, to me as the author, and to 30 years of research on the matter, you should know the book was given the 2000 Paradigm Book Award.

I wrote the book hoping to help heal the breach between the North and South, which I thought was a worthwhile objective. I am not a Southerner. I received my history training at Whittier College, with post graduate work at the University of California and the University of Southern California.

I also have the suspicion that your reviewer did not study my text carefully, which seems to be common for reviewers these days.

Charles Adams
Cato Institute Adjunct Scholar
Washington, DC

Dead Serious

I enjoyed Jacob Sullum's citing "Rave Rage" (August/September), but I do have one small quibble with the lede: "Despite all the pot and LSD consumed at their concerts, no one ever tried to ban the Grateful Dead."

Not true. Not only have many tried, but in the city of Syracuse, N.Y., they succeeded. After a Carrier Dome concert in 1989 that spawned more than 100 drug arrests, the city council passed a resolution permanently banning the Dead from ever playing there again. The ban was still in effect when Jerry Garcia died in 1995 and the band's touring legacy ended.

Ray Lehmann
Union, NJ

Quality Time

Should working mothers rejoice in response to Michael W. Lynch's piece "Kiddie Time" (August/September), which concludes that "children in today's fast-paced America are getting 10 more hours of parental attention each week than they used to?" Statistics don't lie, but conclusions can perhaps be a bit misleading or downright wrong.

The data shows that stay-at-home mothers spent 26.06 hours a week dedicated to parental attention between 1981 and 1997. Meanwhile, in 1997, working mothers spent 26.54 hours. Is this difference significant? All these numbers seem to show is that working mothers today spend about the same amount of time with their kids as stay-at-home moms of the past.

The claim that mothers are now getting 10 more hours with their children is absolutely wrong. According to the numbers presented, working mothers are spending about 4 hours a week more and nonworking mothers about 6 hours more than in 1981. Did Lynch perhaps add these two numbers?

It is amusing that given the same statistics, one could imagine a headline claiming, "Working moms today spend even less time with their children relative to stay-at-home moms than ever before." In 1981 the gap was about 3 hours but today it's about 5 hours—almost a 60 percent increase!

Mark G. Kuzyk
Pullman, WA

Michael W. Lynch replies: There are many ways to cut up any data set, and I thank Mr. Kuzyk for alerting us to perhaps the most negative. I didn't add 4 and 6 to get 10. I simply added something that is often overlooked by people obsessed with professional motherhood: time fathers spend with their children. For children in two-parent families, the increase in parental attention was 10 hours per week. The figure for all children is 7 hours. The study can be found on the Web at www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/papers/rr01-475.pdf. ◻

Artistic paradise lost; the people's right to golf; Iranian rock 'n' roll; governing the ether; ye olde jazz; migration math; and a different sort of conservative Muslim

Artistic paradise lost?

Desert Censorship

Brian Doherty

BURNING MAN, AN annual art festival and experiment in alternative community held in Nevada's Black Rock Desert the week before Labor Day, was once said by founder Larry Harvey to be "the place on earth where the First Amendment is most fully exercised." (See "Burning Man Grows Up," February 2000.) Each year, tens of thousands of participants gather to create giant temporary art objects and live in elaborate interactive theme camps. But this year Pershing County police officers tested the First Amendment, ordering a gay men's camp called Jiffy Lube (slogan: "Get in. Get off. Get out.") to take down, or hide from public view, their central art piece.

The art in question was a cartoonish, 12-foot-tall mechanical piece that portrayed a moving naked man performing anal sex on a kneeling naked man. Jiffy Lube camp organizer J.D. Petras, the piece's designer, decided to avoid possible arrest by moving the piece from public view to inside his camp. Some more radical campers wanted to risk arrest as a First Amendment test case. (In a festival chock full of giant vaginas, some Jiffy Lubers sensed anti-gay bias behind the cops' crackdown.)

During an anti-censorship rally in which protesters carted the piece through Black Rock City, the 24,000-person temporary city that arises to house the festival, founder Larry Harvey told angry campers that, though they might win a First Amendment case, the Burning Man community would be the ultimate loser.

"You'd be famous, man," he told an angry Jiffy Lube camper. "You'd be in *Time* and *Newsweek*. And we'd be off the desert." Harvey said an obscenity arrest would make it impossible to get next year's permits, since they require the cooperation and approval of local authorities.

Burning Man has built a considerable reputation as an anything-goes festival of free expression and liberated community. Devotees are filling computer bulletin boards and listservs with their disappointment that the event organizers didn't stand up to the cops, fearing that the institution of Burning Man has become more important than the principles they thought it stood for. Meanwhile, Harvey argues that friendly dialogue with local law enforcement—unmarred by arrests or court cases—could help ensure that such interference won't happen again. "The last thing [the police] want is to get in the business of policing what is and is not art," Harvey told me in an interview after the event. Because the piece was on a road near a camp dedicated to children, Harvey thinks it was more an issue of appropriate signage than of art censorship.

Petras reports that many disillusioned Burners are planning to "make sure that 'no art censors!' is the unofficial theme for next year. People will be making artwork that's very pushy, just to make a statement and to see how far they can go." ■

The people's right to golf

Hole Tax

Michael W. Lynch

LET'S SAY YOU run a business. Demand is down 20 percent from 1997 to 2000, throwing you $3.2 million in the hole. What



"Women are...discriminated against in business because they have wombs and might have children...but men in all age groups have a higher accident and coronary death rate than women. Certainly a dead employee is a greater loss to a company than one in temporary absence."

—Lynn Kinsky, "Freedom's a Long Time Coming"

"Maybe we're approaching a society—and I have a suspicion that we may be—that isn't so caught up in accumulation. People are starting to find that crass materialism, chasing after a new automobile every two years, is kind of weird."

—"The Future of Marriage: An Interview with Robert Rimmer"

"Two female legislators, Lena K. Lee and Hildagardeis Boswell, introduced a bill in the [Maryland] House of Delegates last February that would have permitted three-year, renewable marriage contracts."

—"Trends"

do you do? If you're a private enterprise, you fail, because no one wants to supply the capital to subsidize your losses. If you're the state of Georgia, which owns seven golf courses, you dip into the taxpayer kitty for $10 million to build two more sets of links.

At one time, Georgia considered getting out of the golf course business. Former Gov. Zell Miller, a Democrat, created a privatization commission in 1995, which brought some change. Two state-run golf courses were dispatched to the private sector and are doing well. Seven others merely contracted out maintenance, which resulted in higher costs, higher green fees, fewer golfers, and larger losses. So with Miller now away in the U.S. Senate, state politicians are declaring privatization a failure and making plans to expand into more unprofitable ventures.

"Some people say it's a waste of money," former Lt. Governor Pierre Howard told *The Atlanta Journal and Constitution*. As a board member of the state's Department of Natural Resources, the bureaucracy responsible for the golf courses, he voted to build the two new greens. "But others say you are giving people an opportunity to have a quality of life."

Iranian rock 'n' roll

God-Worthy Pop

Sara Rimensnyder

IN IRAN, NOT even public lashings have subdued a multi-million-dollar black market for pop music, banned there since theocrats took power 22 years ago. In such a controlled culture, even the most sugary Western pop tunes are deemed a potent political threat—and, of course, a moral one. So in recent years, clerics at the Ministry of Culture have dabbled with a supply-side approach: They've joined the music biz themselves, producing and promoting a handpicked group of local pop artists.

Their most successful act so far is the foxy Shadmehr Aghili. "You know that life is hard without you/but how easily your eyes take death from my heart," he croons in one of many ballads, all government-vetted. He isn't allowed to perform live—it would be a "national security threat," he told *The Washington Post*—but his albums are produced with government dollars and are available throughout the country and abroad.

President Mohammad Khatami's reformist government is mostly responsible for the minor loosening of rigid cultural boundaries in recent years; for example, it endorsed the sale of translated Pink Floyd lyrics in a state-run bookstore. But conservatives have also grudgingly sponsored pop. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei signed off on the construction of Iran's first modern rock studio in 1997, at the Islamic Arts Center in Tehran.

Has Aghili or any other government act distracted fans from illegal music? Not at all, according to Mehrdad Takravan, owner of Los Angeles–based Caltex Records. "The majority of the Iranian people, including the youth, listen to the music we produce here," he says. He launched his label shortly before the Shah fell, when virtually the entire pop music scene fled to California, where it has thrived ever since. Iranian-language music recorded in L.A.—a.k.a. "Tehrangeles"—dominates the bootleg markets abroad, along with mainstream Western fare.

Takravan says that Aghili and others haven't put even a dent in his sales. "No matter what they do, the government has not been able to put down [independent] pop music....They can make many Aghili's, they can clone them, but they won't succeed in putting it down."

Governing the ether

Spectrum Shortage?

Jesse Walker

THERE IS, WE are told, insufficient space on the airwaves for wireless communication. "We are on the verge of a spectrum crisis," former Federal Communications Commission chairman Reed Hundt told *Business 2.0* last spring. "When there is both a tremendous demand for spectrum and a tremendous shortfall, the price for spectrum goes sky-high and innovation goes down, because capitalists devote themselves to acquiring spectrum instead of innovative technology."

Broadcasters, meanwhile, have been claiming that we're out of spectrum for years. But they say this in a much different tone. Broadcasters *want* a shortage: If they can convince regulators that there's no room left for further stations, they can reduce potential competition. Businesses that facilitate point-to-point communication face a different set of economic incentives, and have eagerly exploited new ways to squeeze more signals onto the existing spectrum. When they talk about a spectrum shortage, they mean something



entirely different: that regulators are dragging their feet.

The government has not yet allocated spectrum for the »

Quotes

"For better or worse, I felt the...terrorists and I were on the same wavelength. We both felt it was an important building, although our approaches were a bit different."

—Angus Kress Gillespie, author of a 1999 book on the World Trade Center, recalling the 1993 bombing.

"The result will likely be the worst of both worlds: a huge tax cut and a smaller government."

—Robert B. Reich in the Sept. 17 *New Republic*, lamenting the consequences of not spending the Social Security surplus.

Source

The September deaths of Tom Crosslin and Rollie Rohm after an armed standoff at the Rainbow Farm campground in Vandalia, Michigan, will not be soon forgotten by those who knew the men. Nor by those who know them only as the latest tragic casualties in a brutal, tyrannical drug war. Visit the Web site **rainbowfarmcampground.com**, and you'll be met by a photo of the two smiling jovially, posed in front of a technicolor tractor. One wears tie-dye, the other a silly hat. It's deeply depressing to imagine the relentless harassment and threats that ended with the two burning Crosslin's property, shooting at aircraft, cocking guns at federal officers, and finally being gunned down.

The site now functions as a memorial and a call for donations. Crosslin's family needs money to defend the farm in civil forfeiture proceedings, and to pursue a wrongful death suit against the FBI.

Brickbats

The Astrological Institute, a Phoenix school offering diplomas in astrology and psychology, has won accreditation from the Accrediting Commission of Career Schools and Colleges of Technology. This opens the way for students to pay for their education in star-reading with federal money.

A Pakistani court has convicted college teacher Younus Shaikh of blasphemy and sentenced him to death. Shaikh says a student asked him whether Mohammed was circumcised before receiving God's revelation at age 40; he answered that Mohammed's tribe did not practice the ritual. His students then accused him of teaching that Mohammed did not follow several Muslim practices. Shaikh is one of hundreds jailed in Pakistan for blasphemy.

In Nigeria, rampaging crowds burned down scores of hotels and bars after a lunar eclipse. "The immoral acts committed in these places are responsible for this eclipse," explained one of the riot leaders.

When a couple challenged a school board policy banning boys from wearing earrings to school, Alabama Gov. Don Siegelman weighed in with this theological opinion: "If God had wanted boys to wear earrings, he would have made them girls."

Namibian President Sam Nujoma has ordered police to deport or imprison all homosexuals, blaming "foreign influences" for homosexuality in Namibia.

When Ron Kronk was mailed a citation for running a red light at Wilson and North Lynn in Arlington, Virginia, the evidence was enclosed: a photo taken by a traffic light camera. The same day, he received a second citation, this time for running a red light at the corner of Jefferson Davis Highway and 27th. Attached was more evidence: the same photo that appeared in the first citation.

The city of Washington, D.C., keeps sending Virginia Edens collection notices for parking tickets on other cars. The tickets show her name and address, but someone else's license plate numbers. When she complained to the Department of Motor Vehicles, she was told she should just pay the tickets. Then the DMV discovered that hundreds of people have gotten erroneous tickets. It blames a computer glitch.

Fevzi Shianlioglu, a member of the Turkish Parliament, died of a heart attack on the legislature's floor after suffering head injuries in a vicious fistfight with other lawmakers.

Charles Oliver

"third generation" wireless—3G for short—that will speed up mobile communication, supposedly paving the way for the long-promised wireless Internet. One reason it has not done this is because so much of the spectrum is already in use; tossing in 3G increases the risk of interference.

One solution is to allow the people presently using the spectrum to decide whether they'd rather allocate it to its current use or to 3G. In other words, the government would stop zoning the spectrum and instead let it find its most valued use in the market. The regulators would step back, and the capitalists would have to engage in some capitalism.

Another approach is to free up the airwaves being hoarded by the government. Reps. Chip Pickering (R-Miss.) and Fred Upton (R-Mich.) have proposed a bill to auction off the military's spectrum to 3G companies, using part of the proceeds to shift the Pentagon's spectrum to another part of the ether. The military doesn't like this idea, and though it looked ready to back down in July, one suspects that in the present political environment, the Pentagon will get what it wants.

The best option may be to combine the two ideas, by reviving a proposal made by the economist Ronald Coase over four decades ago: Make the military—and government agencies generally—pay to use the radio band, just like everyone else does.

Strike down the band

Ye Olde Jazz

Brian Doherty

TWO BRITISH LORDS allowed themselves to be brusquely bum-rushed from a London pub in July, for the crime of performing jazz without a license. Lord Corwyn and Lord Redesdale's deliberate act of civil disobedience was a public relations ploy, part of an ongoing campaign to amend a British law that prohibits more than two people from playing music in a pub if the pub lacks an entertainment license. The fines for unlicensed performances can be as much as 20,000 pounds or six months in jail.

That license is often prohibitively difficult or expensive to get. The Weymouth and Portland Borough Council declared in July that even audience members singing along counted toward the number of performers that triggers the permit requirement. The cost of complying with the various local remodeling conditions for the permit—which often include completely new signage and doors—can run to thousands of pounds, and even then with no guarantee the license will actually be issued.

The law dates back to the 18th century, but enforcement was ramped up only in the 1980s as local authorities began to see it as a moneymaking opportunity. The Rolling Stones' spokesman has lamented to the press that strict enforcement of the law during the Swinging '60s would have stopped the Stones in their tracks by severely limiting the number of places they could play.

Most of the proposals on the table for overhauling the law don't involve unfettered liberty for live music, but merely increasing the number of musicians who can perform before triggering the fine, or streamlin-

Balance Sheet

Jeff A. Taylor

Miami Heat

A federal judge says Elián González's supporters can sue former Attorney General Janet Reno for injuries received during the April 2000 INS raid to seize the boy: "A reasonable officer...would know that the law forbade her from directing the execution of a warrant in a manner that called for unjustified force."

Free Birds

The California Board of Equalization rules 5–0 that the Los Angeles County assessor cannot tax orbiting satellites. The county wanted Hughes Electronics to pay taxes on eight birds, 22,300 miles up. Last year a judge ordered Virginia Beach, Virginia, to return $360,000 it had collected from the Fox Network for its satellite transponders.

Labor Pains

Eugene Scalia, nominee to be the Labor Department's top lawyer, defends his opposition to wacky Clinton-era workplace safety regulations. Scalia's dismissal of ergonomic regs as based on "quackery" and "junk science" drives Big Labor–loving pols insane.

Union Label

Dutch hookers—a.k.a. "workers in the sex industry"—form the world's first trade union for prostitutes. Last year Holland legalized brothels, and now pros say they need to organize to win better treatment from banks and insurance companies.

Smoked Eats

Restaurant owners in Ames, Iowa, sue the city over an anti-smoking ordinance. Owners of Cyclone Truck Stop and six other eateries say state law allows smoking in public places. Restaurants in Marquette, Michigan, won a similar case in March.

Face Off

The sudden popularity of face-recognition technology ignores that using it to scan big crowds for terrorists cannot possibly work. False acceptance and detection rates combine to mean that one in three people would have to be stopped to catch 90 percent of the bad guys.

Flag Daze

Indiana is one of 48 states that still outlaws burning the American flag, despite Supreme Court rulings that the act is protected speech. One Hoosier was arrested for burning a flag behind his home.

Power Drunk

In Florida, drunk driving is whatever the cops say it is, a federal judge rules. District Court Judge Richard Lazzara says 0.01 percent on a breath-alcohol test—well below the state's 0.08 DUI level—can take a back seat to officers' "personal observations of plaintiff's physical appearance and his performance on the field sobriety tests, as well as plaintiff's admission to having consumed alcohol."

Papers Please

An airline industry group is among the backers of a smart I.D. card for all Americans. Such a "transportation card" would be needed to fly a plane, board a train, or rent a car.

Railroad Tithe

Amtrak says $3 billion more for security and service improvements will make rail travel a real alternative to the nation's weary flyways. But the trains shouldn't need federal help if nobody wants to fly: They might finally have passengers. Amtrak has until 2003 to end 30 years of reliance on government subsidies or be dissolved.

Migration Math

Michael W. Lynch

When President George W. Bush met with Mexican President Vicente Fox and made noise about handing out some 3 million new green cards to illegal aliens, immigration supporters and opponents were quick to weigh in with studies. It's no surprise that the anti-immigration Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) and the pro-immigration North American Integration and Development Center (NAIDC) came to opposite conclusions. What's surprising is that they generated those conclusions based on the same economic model.

In July, the CIS released a report documenting the low education of, and high use of welfare services by, Mexican immigrants. Using a National Research Council (NRC) model developed to quantify the economic affects of immigration, it concluded that the average immigrant drains $55,200 from government coffers over his lifetime.

The NAIDC released its report in late August. Building on the same NRC model, it claims that Mexican immigrants add $300 billion to the economy each year. While the CIS study says that low education levels are a burden, NAIDC concludes that the feds ought to pay Mexico $320 million a year for educating part of the U.S. workforce.

There's another view on what should define immigration policy: The data-free notion that in a free society, people ought to be able to move where they can best pursue their happiness.

Mexican-born living in the U.S.
7,197,000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Legal annual immigration from Mexico
131,600
Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Estimated annual illegal immigration from Mexico
150,000
Source: INS



› ing and nationalizing the permit process to prevent local authorities from taking undue advantage.

Don't try this at home

Counter-Surveillance

Brian Doherty

NOTORIOUS CYPHERPUNK ACTIVIST Jim Bell is heading to jail again for what he sees as a mere attempt to remind the government that surveillance can work both ways.

Government agents had been monitoring Bell since his 1996 essay "Assassination Politics," which suggests using secure cryptography to raise and pay bounties for the assassination of corrupt government officials. After the piece was widely distributed on the Internet, agents tapped into a cypherpunk mailing list and infiltrated meetings of a private "common law court" in Multnomah County, Oregon, to track Bell's goings-on and to collect incriminating evidence. Their surveillance of Bell even included installing a GPS tracking device on his car.

Such surveillance, combined with Bell's erratic, troublesome behavior, made him an easy target. After he was caught using fake Social Security numbers (he doesn't think anyone has a right to his real number) and setting off a stink bomb outside an IRS office, he was jailed for 3 years starting in 1997.

Now he's heading back to prison. In August, a court sentenced the MIT-graduate chemist to 10 years for stalking and harassing IRS agent Jeff Gordon. In response to the government's surveillance, Bell had been tracking down agents' home addresses (including Gordon's) through Department of Motor Vehicles records and showing up at their homes—and in one case stealing their mail. He was merely using public records for legitimate protest and free speech, he argued in court.

Gas tax alternative

Follow That Car

Jeremy Lott

WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES eliminate the need for cars to burn fossil fuels, how will governments collect tax revenues to build and maintain roads? A new study by the University of Iowa is testing an innovative and perverse solution: Bug the cars.

The study, funded by the Federal Highway Administration and a consortium of nine concerned states, is outfitting a fleet of vehicles with onboard computers that use global positioning satellites to calculate mileage and send this info to a third party, probably the federal government. The hypothetical tax is based on miles driven, rather than on type of vehicle or weight.

Addressing the protests of civil libertarians, project manager David Forkenbrock told the Des Moines Register, "We are taking every pain to make sure that people's privacy is not disturbed." As evidence, he noted that the prototype system "doesn't say that you traveled on 42nd Street at 2 a.m. Thursday morning."

Such assurances do not go far enough for state Sen. Bill Bullard (R-Mich.). As a representative in a state that is part of the nine-member body, he has introduced legislation to ban toll tracking, denouncing it as a Big Brother measure.

"I don't think we want gov-

ernment in possession of the knowledge of how many miles somebody drives in a given period of time, or potentially where they are going every minute of every given day," Bullard says. "The privacy implications are horrendous."

Given the latest advances in GPS technology, the government could measure that particular slippery slope to the nearest 20 centimeters.

Web playgrounds

Dotty Idea

Rhys Southan

WHEN THE INTERNET Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) released its list of seven new top-level domains last summer, critics of the government-sanctioned corporation complained the new options were too limited. But since ICANN decides what can be a top-level domain—for example, the new .biz—on the world's primary Internet hub, the rejected domains could only, at best, retreat to less accessible servers. (See "Unsanctioned Webs," Citings, April.)

Some congressmen, however, decided that one rejected domain, .kids, was a moral (or at least political) imperative. In June, John Shimkus (R-Ill.) and Ed Markey (D-Mass.) proposed the Dot Kids Domain Name Act, a bill that would require ICANN to immediately develop a .kids top-level domain.

Advocates of .kids say it would be a "green space" for children to frolic on the Internet, a sort of digital park free of drugs, guns, and pornography. Pages that register for the domain would have to submit to yet-to-be-determined standards of decency, and if they didn't comply, would have to amend their pages or be kicked off.

Unlike the congressmen, ICANN doesn't consider a totally G-rated domain to be feasible. In an early assessment of the .kids proposal, the company wrote, "The unique value of the .kids domain lies in meeting parents' expectations that it will be a safe area of the Internet for their children. The proposal provides very little technical support for meeting this goal, and it is unclear if the proposers understand the magnitude of the task of auditing 2.5 million names/web sites and handling complaints."

Markey and Shimkus counter that while a .kids domain wouldn't be perfect, it would at least be safer than what they see as a horrifying .com world where an unwitting child seeking information about the White House might accidentally discover the ins and outs of bukkake instead.

"We had hoped that through our hearings and our discussions with [ICANN] about trying to protect kids, that they would have moved on this in their most recent awarding of top-level domains," Shimkus says. "Of course, a top-level domain to help protect kids was not found on the list. So we did what we could based upon encouragement. And when that doesn't work, then we move on to legislative language, which is what we've done."

A Different Sort of Conservative Muslim

Sam MacDonald

Abdulwahab Alkebsi

Abdulwahab Alkebsi arrived in the U.S. from Yemen on New Year's Day in 1980. Within a few years he had graduated from Rutgers with a double major in computer science and engineering and had gone on to get his master's degree in computer science from American University. He also became an American citizen and a political player: He's the executive director of the Islamic Institute, a Washington think tank that "facilitates the development of grassroots Muslim political movements that are economically conservative." **reason**'s Washington Editor Sam MacDonald spoke with Alkebsi a few days after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Q: When someone refers to Osama bin Laden, they call him a "Muslim terrorist." How do you respond to that?

A: It's becoming part of the lingo right now. Language is important in these matters, and the language is wrong. Let's call bin Laden what he is: He is a terrorist. It has nothing to do with Islam—just as much as you don't want to call Timothy McVeigh a Christian terrorist or a Christian killer.

Q: Will the attacks make it harder for Muslims to integrate into American culture?

A: The vast majority of Americans accept us totally, 100 percent, as Americans. Let me be very clear. This is the best place in the world to be a Muslim. You have the ingredients to be a true Muslim over here. Being a true Muslim doesn't mean you wear a head scarf, and it doesn't mean you don't wear a head scarf. It's a choice thing, and this is where we get that choice.

Q: After getting over the sheer shock of the attacks, what was your first reaction as the head of an Islamic group?

A: My religion really didn't cross my mind. The first thing that crossed my mind, for all the first day, was as an American. It was shock. It was fear. My reaction had nothing to do with me being a Muslim. Then the reports started coming about the connections to bin Laden, the connection to, in the vocabulary, *Islamic* extremists, *Islamic* terrorists.

Q: The Islamic Institute is politically conservative. Is that where most Muslim Americans fit into the political spectrum?

A: It's part of who we are. The sanctity of life is very important to Muslims. The majority of Muslims are also immigrants. A big portion of them are small-business owners who want lower taxes and less government infringement on their business. It's not that Muslims are Republicans. Muslims tend to be conservatives who care about the poor and the elderly, so compassionate conservatism fell right in our laps. It's been a rallying cry, and it's been very helpful.



What Are We Marchin' For?

Anti-war protesters offer everything—but an alternative.

ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, America's new peaceniks spent hours winding through the tense streets of Washington, D.C., before settling in a telling location—directly across the street from the International Monetary Fund. It wasn't supposed to be that way. In the days following September 11, anti-globalization forces supposedly shifted focus away from a massive mobilization against the IMF and World Bank annual meetings. That made sense. The meetings had been canceled in the wake of the horrifying terrorist attacks. Moreover, organizers realized that they needed to deliver a new message to a world community inflamed with thoughts of war and retribution. But that message was nowhere to be seen, thanks to an embarrassing lack of direction that plagues the fledgling anti-war movement.

The activists' problem developed early on. On September 20, the Washington Peace Center scheduled a "teach-in" for peace at D.C.'s Meridian Hill Baptist Church. Approximately 250 activists crowded the church's steamy, pink-walled basement, eager to display their anti-everything credentials. They were against war. They enthusiastically hissed whenever a speaker stooped to mention President George W. Bush. Their dreadlocked, multiply pierced heads shook from side to side as they considered such a racist and empire-crazed America. Unfortunately, not one of the five speakers had any suggestions as to what Bush *should* do.

Rev. Graylan Hagler delivered the most entertaining speech. With a flurry of fire and brimstone, he railed against the U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations conference on racism, and charged that Zionism *is* in fact racism. These were the "root causes" of the violence—American arrogance, corporate imperialism, greed, and racism. No wonder they attacked us!

There was an awkward silence when I asked what the protesters were actually *for*. Sam Husseini, communications director of the Institute for Public Accuracy, eventually offered a "multinational" solution, noting that a U.N. directive details how nations should respond to terrorism. When I asked if that directive ever mentions the use of force—or if he supported those sections that might—the moderator told me I could ask only one question. Michele Bollinger, a self-described socialist who teaches public school, chimed in with the notion that anti-war protesters don't have to be *for* anything. "I don't think the anti-war movement needs to provide solutions to all the world's problems," Bollinger said to rousing applause. "All I think the anti-war movement needs to do is fight against an unjust war."

As the protesters filtered out to find a spot to watch that night's presidential address to the nation, a perplexed twentysomething asked why I was so dead set on violence. I asked him what he proposed instead. He said we should force the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial. I asked him what America should do if they refused. "I don't think they are in a position to do that," he said. "They'll do whatever we say because they are afraid of us." I asked why they were afraid. He did not have an answer.

I expected more from the anti-war movement the following Thursday. Hundreds of left-wing protesters poured into All Souls Church on 16th Street to listen to their academic hero, Howard Zinn, author of *A People's History of the United States*. After a round of speeches, a few brave souls in the crowd asked the same question I did a week before: If we're against war, what are we for?

Again, no answer. Zinn advocated a course

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

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

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2001, Occasional Paper 115, 0-255 36497-0, 80pp



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of action—or inaction—that doctors take when treating a disease they cannot diagnose: "First, do no harm." He analogized further, saying that when police are searching for a criminal they can't find, they do not simply bomb everyone hoping to hit the suspect. In short, he doesn't know how to bring the terrorists to justice. He just knows how not to do it.

Husseini (he was on this panel, too) argued that the peace movement doesn't really need to offer an alternative because the barbaric Bush administration doesn't want peace anyway. I asked what the plan would be if Bush *was* amenable to it. Husseini said it didn't matter because he wasn't. I tried to rephrase the question and ask it one more time, but the same moderator who cut me off the week before did it again.

The next day, approximately 10,000 protesters hit the capital's streets for a set of marches all in the name of peace. Or at least they were supposed to be about peace. One, organized by the Anti-Capitalist Convergence, started at 9 a.m. on Capitol Hill and snaked its way toward the White House. Another, sponsored by the less militant but equally vocal International Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition (ANSWER), formed near the White House and marched toward Capitol Hill. The two groups merged for awhile at Freedom Plaza on 13th Street. On Sunday they joined forces at Meridian Hill Park in Adams Morgan and marched into Dupont Circle.

Despite all the marching, singing, screaming, and drumming, a coherent message never emerged. On Saturday, a group of about 50 black-clad anarchists seemed chagrined that the riots they envisioned for the IMF/

World Bank protests never came to pass. They sat on a grassy hill next to Freedom Plaza, temporarily lowering their handkerchief masks to smoke pot while the chanting continued on the street. Fewer than 20 people were arrested all day, despite an enormous police presence. Many protesters had traffic pylons duct-taped to their forearms to ward off baton blows that never came, gas masks to protect them from tear-gas that was never used, and goggles to shield them from pepper spray—which police did deploy in one brief flare-up.

Numerous signs declared "End Wage Disparity Now," as if Osama bin Laden and associates killed 6,000 people because they want a higher minimum wage. One intrepid soul was handing out "Free Mumia" fliers. Perhaps the Taliban is against imprisoning people for political reasons? Many others blamed the new administration by carrying signs that said "Fuck Bush," which does little to explain the many terror attacks the world suffered prior to January.

Indeed, the weekend seminars sponsored by a coalition of anti-globalization networks show just how hard it has been for the movement to focus on alternatives to war instead of alternatives to the International Monetary Fund. This was the lineup of teach-in topics for Friday: World Bank Bonds Boycott; the New Face of Structural Adjustment and "Private Sector Development"; Jubilee and Reparations; and Legislative, which dealt with congressional funding for the IMF/World Bank. Not much changed on Saturday: HIV/AIDS and Intellectual Property Rights; Labor and Sweatshops; Corporate Globalization and Indigenous Rights; Privatization; Land and Environment; and Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. Not a single seminar focused on finding a proper response to the attacks of September 11.

All weekend, college kids and aging hippies did their best to emulate their 1960s anti-war counterparts, dusting off chants such as "One, two, three, four, we don't want your racist war." In a nod to the peace-loving communes that have sustained the left for generations, there was even a free vegetarian kitchen in Freedom Plaza. Despite the largely successful mobilization of bodies, however, everyone apparently forgot to dream up an answer to the only question that matters for now: Someone attacked Manhattan and the Pentagon. What should we do?

It's not that protesting a war is wrong. People who oppose war in every instance have a right—even a moral obligation—to argue the point; so do folks who think fighting in Afghanistan will only make matters worse. Yet this is a different kind of war, even for the protesters. In the '60s you could say things like "make love, not war." Just bring the boys home and it would be over—the Ho Chi Minh Trail couldn't reach New York.

But Osama bin Laden can. He proved it. People are afraid he will do it again. Saying you are against the war is not enough. People will not listen unless you have a different way to keep terrorists from burning American cities. Given that rescue workers will undoubtedly be pulling corpses from the rubble for a long, long time, protesters should think of an alternative to war before they march again. ◻

Sam MacDonald (smacdonald@reason.com) is **reason***'s Washington editor.*

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

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Liberty's Paradoxes

Must we surrender freedoms in order to remain free?

THE DAY BEFORE LABOR DAY, I flew to Colorado Springs to teach a three-week course at Colorado College. When I flew home to New Jersey at the end of the month, it was in a different world—one where I had to move my nail clippers from my carry-on bag to my suitcase before boarding the plane, armed federal marshals were conspicuously patrolling the airports, and a disfigured Manhattan skyline was visible from the plane's windows as it approached Newark Airport.

America launched fighter jets against the Taliban regime in October, but psychologically, we have been at war since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. War—to state the obvious—is generally not a good time for advocates of smaller government. Indeed, liberals' anti-militarist instincts often coexist (uneasily, one imagines) with a pronounced affection for the public spirit generated by war and other emergencies. In the October 22 issue of *The American Prospect*, Jeff Faux, president of the leftist Economic Policy Institute, waxed enthusiastic over the statist lessons allegedly to be learned from the tragedy: "How ill served we have been by a politics that perpetuates the illusion that we are all on our own and holds the institutions of public service in contempt."

Unfortunately for liberals, the growth of government and the turn from individualism in wartime extends not only to economic matters but to civil liberties. American history offers a number of unfortunate reminders of this fact, from the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War to the evisceration of the First Amendment during World War I to the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration quickly proposed legislation that would expand the federal government's wiretapping and cyber-surveillance powers and allow the indefinite detention, without filing charges and without judicial review, of foreigners suspected of terrorist connections.

There's little doubt, too, that the national mood has shifted in a pro-government direction. It is perhaps symbolic that New York Mayor Rudolph Guiliani, recently widely assailed for his authoritarian tendencies (even by those who applauded the anti-crime initiatives of his first term), emerged as the can't-do-wrong hero of the moment. Not surprisingly, there is widespread support for federalizing airport security, a task currently entrusted to the private sector. Various polls show that up to 80 percent of Americans expect and accept some abridgments of individual freedom to combat the threat of terrorism. Polls, of course, should not dictate policy, but they act as a proxy for what government is likely to try to do.

How should champions of individual liberty respond? Line up as the usual suspects on the other side, opposing every measure that would increase the size and power of government and quoting the maxim that those who would sacrifice liberty to gain safety end up having neither? Or is this where we stop to ponder the possibility that the preservation of freedom may require some unpleasant compromises, not only to safeguard ourselves from terrorism but to prevent worse encroachments of freedom further down the road?

"We've been having an academic discussion and holding our breath in this area for several years. We can't do that anymore," said Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) shortly after the attacks. This can—and probably should—be seen as a cynically cavalier dismissal of concerns about civil liberties, a reflection of

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

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the mentality that freedom matters *only until push comes to shove.* Yet, in the face of that nightmarish reality TV show broadcast in September, some of those debates do seem academic. Certainly, we can have no illusions about what we're dealing with. There are people who want to destroy us and our way of life. We have witnessed the length to which they are willing and able to go. Perhaps the real surprise is that it didn't happen sooner. The first bombing of the World Trade Center, in 1993, was itself intended to topple the Twin Towers. (Those earlier terrorists reportedly aimed for a body count of 250,000.) Subsequent to the '93 attack, the government foiled a plot by Islamic radicals to blow up two main roadways into New York City, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels. We have no idea what could happen next, but chemical and biological terrorism loom large on people's minds.

If the form of the next attack is unknowable, this much is clear: The actions and the rhetoric of the terrorists undercut the idea, popular among some libertarians and left-wingers, that our vulnerability to terrorism is itself the fault of the expansionist, imperialist state. According to this line of thinking, if the U.S. government stopped playing GloboCop, withdrew from meddling in regions where we have no real national interest, and limited itself to providing for a national defense, there wouldn't be all those people around the world baying for our blood. This argument is myopic for two reasons.

First, while there is room—and need— for legitimate debate about America's global role and the nature of our true national interests, the notion that we ought to allow the threat

of terrorism to dictate our foreign policy is not only humiliating but ultimately self-defeating. What other concessions will various groups around the world try to extract from the wealthiest and most powerful nation on earth once they see that intimidation works?

Second, there is every reason to believe that our current enemies, fundamentalist Islamic militants, are motivated by far more than U.S. support for Israel, the plight of the Palestinians, economic sanctions against Iraq, and the presence of U.S. troops on the Arabian peninsula, the main canards of the finger-pointers. In fact, what makes America the Great Satan in their eyes is precisely what libertarians cherish—"our secular culture of freedom, reason, and the pursuit of happiness," as philosopher David Kelley put it in an eloquent post-attack essay titled "The Assault on Civilization."

We could curb our involvement in world affairs and religious radicals would still want to kill us for corrupting their world with our movies, books, fast-food restaurants, blue jeans, and ideas about women's liberation. The head of the repressive Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar, rails at "filthy and ugly Western cultures" which, among other things, "allow women to be dishonored." In a prison interview with sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer (described in Juergensmeyer's 2000 book, *Terror in the Mind of God*), Mahmud Abouhalima, one of the men convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, said that his holy war was against Western "secularists" who were exporting their way of life to Muslim countries.

Given such a mentality, there is no question that terrorism will remain a threat to our way of life. To guard against it, we'll have to put up with tougher security at airports and in other public places where large casualties are possible. The movements of foreigners will be scrutinized more closely, and there will be a certain amount of racial profiling directed at Middle Eastern men. No matter how much we fight it, the government's powers to monitor private individuals' communications—including e-mail and other forms of electronic communications—will undoubtedly be expanded; the real question is by how much.

It is perhaps the surveillance of electronic communications that most—and most rightly—exercises the libertarian soul. I certainly don't like the idea of the government snooping on e-mail or keeping track of Web addresses I have visited. However, if one accepts the U.S. system of limited government with checks and balances, one also has to accept that the government's proper powers include searches and seizures—as long as they are reasonable and subject to judicial oversight and due process.

Privacy advocates correctly point to significant problems with currently legal methods of e-mail surveillance, such as the infamous Carnivore. These tools enable the government to intercept far more information without a warrant—i.e. without probable cause—than traditional telephone wiretapping. These also allow government agents to act with far less external oversight and thus create far more potential for misconduct and misuse. All these issues need to be addressed and taken seriously. But to address them, we need to recognize that under some circumstances, surveillance of private communication is indeed a legitimate government activity related to one of the most basic functions of government: national security.

Even in this time of terror, Americans aren't prepared to sacrifice freedom mindlessly to security. Polls show that most people are willing to accept minor encroachments on privacy and liberty but reject giving the state blanket powers of surveillance. Some of the more extreme ideas in proposed anti-terrorism measures have already been excised (e.g., national identity cards) or weakened (in the latest version of congressional legislation, the authority to detain foreigners without charges or judicial review will be limited to one week). It goes without saying that, in waging a war on terrorism on the home front, we must tread very, very carefully—particularly since, unlike the foreign wars of the past, this one may well drag on indefinitely and become a permanent state of siege.

American optimism, wonderful as it is, often makes it difficult for us to confront the reality of tragic paradoxes. The technological advances made possible by a dynamic, free, capitalist society have put horrific means of destruction in the hands of people who loathe Western civilization. Deadly force on a massive scale has been privatized—and the results, in some ways, are scarier than the threat we faced from totalitarian empires, because we are dealing with a more elusive, more fanatical, and more desperate enemy. Such tragic paradoxes, alas, will require some tragic choices. ◻

Contributing Editor Cathy Young (cathyyoung2@cs.com) writes a column for the Boston Globe.

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

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

Drugs and Thugs

The U.S. subsidy for terrorists

SHORTLY AFTER THE September terrorist attacks, House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) unveiled a new panel: the Speaker's Task Force for a Drug Free America. "The illegal drug trade is the financial engine that fuels many terrorist organizations around the world, including Osama bin Laden," he explained. "By going after the illegal drug trade, we reduce the ability of these terrorists to launch attacks against the United States."

Actually, "going after the illegal drug trade" is what allows terrorists to fund their operations with profits inflated by prohibition. In that sense, the $40 billion or so the U.S. spends on drug law enforcement each year represents a subsidy for murderers. Banning a product that people want creates an opportunity for criminals, who can earn big profits because they are willing to risk producing, transporting, and selling contraband.

This "risk premium" means cocaine and heroin sell for 20 to 40 times as much as they otherwise would. Prohibition thus delivers to armed thugs a handy stream of revenue, which they can dip into by selling drugs or by taxing producers and traffickers. Bin Laden's organization seems to have benefited from the drug trade indirectly: Opium money supports his Taliban hosts in Afghanistan.

Stronger enforcement, Hastert's favored solution, would tend to increase the risks of drug trafficking, eliminate competitors, and raise profits. So it hardly makes sense to fight terrorism by cracking down on drugs.

In fact, the events of September 11 highlighted how the War on Drugs has skewed the government's priorities and compromised our security. The cost of focusing on traffickers instead of terrorists was illustrated by the announcement that federal drug agents would be trained to protect travelers because there aren't enough sky marshals. Given the government's failure to stop hijacked airliners from slamming into the World Trade Center, can it really afford to have so many personnel trying to stop illegal drugs from entering the U.S.?

It will not do simply to say that the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism must be waged simultaneously. Aside from the problem that one war generates the black-market profits that help support our enemies in the other, we have to face the fact that our resources are finite. Every dollar spent intercepting drugs is a dollar that could be spent intercepting bombs. Every agent infiltrating a drug cartel is an agent who could be infiltrating a terrorist cell.

We have to ask ourselves which is scarier: a dealer who sells an intoxicant to a willing buyer or a terrorist who murders people at random. Confronting that question does not necessarily mean repealing prohibition (the approach I'd prefer), but it does mean taking into account the trade-offs associated with the drug war.

That is something John P. Walters, President Bush's choice to head the Office of National Drug Control Policy, has shown little inclination to do. Walters, awaiting an all-but-certain Senate confirmation as of this writing, seems to be an unreconstructed drug war hawk. He has criticized the Clinton administration, under which drug arrests and anti-drug spending hit record levels, for being soft on drugs. Even as other conservatives concluded that prison cells were better used to incapacitate predatory criminals, he continued to support harsh mandatory sentences for nonviolent drug offenders.

Although the effort to "stop the flow of drugs" is plainly futile—managing, at best, to shift around smuggling routes and sources of supply—Walters apparently remains an interdiction enthusiast. He has even praised Peru's policy of shooting down suspected traffickers, a practice that took the lives of an American missionary and her baby last spring.

Perhaps recent events have tempered Walters' views by bringing home the point that America faces threats worse than drugs. Former DEA chief Robert C. Bonn, now the customs commissioner, seems to have seen the light. "Terrorism is our highest priority," he says, "bar none." ◻

Senior Editor Jacob Sullum (jsullum@reason.com) is writing a book on the morality of drug use.

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

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Ironic Engagement

The hidden agenda of the anti-ironists

UNLIKE THE THOUSANDS of World Trade Center victims who spent weeks officially missing before being declared deceased, irony was pronounced dead while the embers were still hot. In a 21st century update of the regrettably mistaken maxim that there could be no poetry after Auschwitz, the end-of-irony announcement swept the nation with force and flatulence.

"One good thing could come from this horror: It could spell the end of the age of irony," wrote Roger Rosenblatt, essayist for *Time* and Jim Lehrer's *Newshour*. "For some 30 years—roughly as long as the Twin Towers were upright—the good folks in charge of America's intellectual life have insisted that nothing was to be believed in or taken seriously." That self-scolding sentiment was echoed around the country, perhaps second only to the canard that we had been punished for our "isolationism."

"We've been a smirky, arrogant bunch," ran a typical item—titled "Will tragedy change us for the better?"—in the *Sacramento Bee*. Graydon Carter, a *Spy* magazine founder and now editor of the page-heavy and idea-light celebrity glossy *Vanity Fair*, asserted that the media's ironic pose "was on its last legs," adding, "I have a feeling something fresh will emerge. When you have something so cataclysmic happen you almost can't help it. You had a whole new kind of writing after World War II."

If you get past the offensiveness of thinking anything good will come of mass slaughter or the dubious belief that taking a page from the decidedly unironic book of Islamic zealotry is the best course for our nation, the death of irony has some appeal. Certainly, withering sarcasm feels hollow and meaningless after the horror of the attacks. Then again, so do World War II movies.

But this particular funeral is one we had attended many times before Mohammed Atta took his first flying lesson. Since at least the late 1980s, various sages have been pronouncing the end of irony. Indeed, Rosenblatt, who specializes in the precious word soufflés popular with earnest public broadcasting fans, had himself already announced irony's defeat in a 2000 New Year special issue of *Time*.

The War On Irony never had a clear enemy. Any concept that describes the corporate froth of *Entertainment Weekly*, Swift's "Modest Proposal," and the deadpan satire of *The Onion* is already broad enough to be valueless. That Graydon Carter—whose journey from the vitriolic *Spy* to the starfucking *Vanity Fair* has been a real-time illustration of the axiom that we become what we most despise—is considered an ironic fellow at all demonstrates how weightless this argument is.

In any case, deadpan japery isn't the cause of disaffection but the result. What Rosenblatt calls "prancing around in an air of vain stupidity" was never the sole province of the celebrity culture; it applied equally to self-important essayists, solemn anchormen, and an uninterrupted string of state departments whose rambunctious and provocative foreign policies betrayed the non-interventionist sensibilities of the populace and left us open to the wrath of omnicidal fanatics. The wisenheimers who paid no respects to such dolts did not get us into this mess—straight-faced true believers of all stripes did.

But what Rosenblatt—author of a memoir of attending Harvard during the Vietnam War and the new, fret-filled *Rules for Aging*—has in mind isn't really a rejection of Juvenalian satire but a scolding of a younger crew that never took generational spokesmen like himself seriously. Note that his chosen time frame of "the last 30 years" coincides neatly with the decline of baby boomer impregnability, as a new cohort has been willing to ignore the nuncios and Kodak moments of the '68ers.

And now those same spoiled little pricks even have their own galvanizing national tragedy, one that in less than two hours reduced not only the Kennedy assassination and Kent State but even Pearl Harbor to relative insignificance. What has vanished from the earth isn't irony or skepticism. It's the ability of the generational priesthood to keep claiming that kids today never had it tough.

Tim Cavanaugh (tim@simpleton.com) is a writer living in California.

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

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

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

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Guarding the Home Front

Will civil liberties be a casualty in the War on Terrorism?

IF THE FIRST CASUALTY of war is the truth, the second casualty is often the liberty of law-abiding citizens. In the wake of the horrific September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States declared total war on terrorism. President George W. Bush has laid out some of the sacrifices the government will demand of its citizens: "You will be asked for your patience, for the conflict will not be short. You will be asked for your resolve, for the conflict will not be easy. You will be asked for your strength, because the course to victory may be long." He has also insisted that "we must make sure that the law enforcement men and women have got the tools necessary, within the Constitution, to defeat the enemy."

Despite the nod to constitutional restraints on police power, some of the tools Bush and other politicians have proposed—national I.D. cards, roving wiretaps, indefinite detainment of suspects, lower burdens of proof, intensified surveillance, and much more—raise serious questions about the government's commitment to civil liberties. In late September, **reason** asked a panel of experts to discuss which civil liberties they thought were most at risk in what has been called America's first 21st century war.

Enough Already

Jerry Berman

My first fear is that the government will expand intelligence investigations and break down the wall that Congress established after Watergate to prohibit the kind of surveillance that was conducted against domestic dissent during the civil rights and Vietnam War eras.

Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the intelligence community already has vast authority to conduct intelligence and criminal investigations of terrorist activities. Our intelligence community can already conduct secret electronic surveillance, engage in secret searches, and plant bugs against terrorists. The act covers foreign powers and terrorist enterprises. It applies overseas and in the United States and allows wiretapping, bugs, and surveillance directed at Americans, as well as foreigners, who may be engaged in terrorist activities on behalf of enterprises like bin Laden's network. The standard for this surveillance is less restrictive than what we require for domestic criminal surveillance.

The attorney general wants to change the primary purpose of those taps from intelligence, which is why they get a lower standard, to any purpose, meaning they could be used for criminal investigations. This would vastly expand federal authority to use surveillance without probable cause.

Federal agents still need to make the case that the expanded powers for which they are asking are necessary. To date, there has been no evidence, either from classified briefings or any public source, that restrictions in the law hindered their efforts to know about bin Laden and his associates. It wasn't a restriction breakdown. It was an analysis breakdown. ■

Jerry Berman is the executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, a high-tech civil liberties and Internet policy organization. He has worked on all the intelligence guidelines passed since Watergate.

Government's Loaded Weapon

Clint Bolick

Detention without trial. Racial profiling. Electronic surveillance. National identification cards. The growing list of proposals in the wake of the September 11 attacks makes it tough to single one out as the most threatening to our civil liberties. Much depends on the contours of the power, how it's exercised, and whether it has an end point.

More worrisome is the notion that our civil liberties are subject to cancellation in times of crisis. Our Constitution seeks to protect rights the Framers deemed inalienable. It faces its gravest tests in times of crisis.

We have traveled this road often before, and we should draw upon the lessons of history. In his dissenting opinion in *Korematsu v. United States*, which upheld Japanese internment camps, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote that "a judicial construction...that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself....[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes the Constitution to show that [it] sanctions such an order...the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination....The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." What other principles are we prepared to sacrifice?

With determination, we will get past this crisis. The

question is: Will we do so with our constitutional system—the cornerstone of our free society—fully intact? If not, the terrorists will have extracted even more grievous costs than those already apparent.

Clint Bolick is vice president and director of state chapter development for the Institute for Justice, a Washington, D.C.-based public interest law firm.

Lessons Never Taught

Jim Bovard

The blind glorification of government currently prevailing puts almost all liberties at grave risk. Most of the media and most of the politicians are stampeding behind the notion that the greatest danger is any limit on federal power. The Justice Department wish list of remedies invokes the danger of terrorism to seek sweeping new powers to be used against all classes of alleged criminals.

The determination of some members of the Bush administration to use the terrorist attacks to wage wars against a laundry list of "rogue nations" could mean that aggressive military action continues indefinitely—along with the pretext to suppress Americans' freedom of speech and movement. And if there is another successful terrorist attack that kills many Americans, the pressure for severe crackdowns will probably be irresistible—regardless of how badly government agencies screwed up in failing to prevent the attack. At least for the time being, people have lost any interest in government's batting average—either for actually protecting citizens or for abusing power.

The best hope for the survival and defense of liberty is that enough Americans will recall the history lessons that public schools never teach.

Jim Bovard is the author, most recently, of Feeling Your Pain: The Explosion & Abuse of Government Power in the Clinton-Gore Years (St. Martin's Press).

Beware of Tom Ridge

Alexander Cockburn

For a foretaste of the sort of assault on civil liberties we might expect, we need go no further than the actions last year of George W. Bush's nominee to run the newly minted Office of Homeland Security (OHS), Gov. Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania.

Last July, in preparation for anti-World Trade Organization demonstrations scheduled at the same time as the Republican National Convention, Philadelphia saw coordinated law enforcement involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local and state police, with covert surveillance, infiltration, and disruption of legitimate groups, snooping on e-mail, and phone taps. Protest leaders were arrested early on, under absurd pretexts and, in the case of John Sellers (of the Ruckus Society) and Kate Sorensen (ACT-UP), held on $1,000,000 bail. Jailed protesters were brutally handled, denied access to medical care and attorneys, and thrown into cells with dangerous inmates.

When all was over, the courts threw out 95 percent of the charges brought against protesters by the Philadelphia police. Ridge presided over an utterly disgraceful and violent denial of freedom of assembly, free speech, and due process.

The only comfort we can expect is that the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Pentagon, and the Coast Guard will see the OHS as a bureaucratic threat to their turf and move swiftly to neutralize it. I have no doubt that these seasoned bureaucratic fighters will soon be leaking information to discredit Ridge and the OHS.

Alexander Cockburn is a syndicated columnist and co-editor of the radical newsletter CounterPunch (www.counterpunch.org).

The End of Privacy

Jim Harper

Goaded by leftist privacy advocates, Congress has been toying with the idea of regulating the private sector in the name of privacy. As we now see, governments themselves are the most powerful, constantly lurking threats. The War on Terrorism will strike hard at the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the shelter of this already-too-weak freedom, Americans protect what remains of their privacy from government. Because no one yet knows what national security lapses allowed the heinous September 11 attacks to occur, laws expanding warrantless wiretapping amount to a ritual wartime shedding of civil liberties. The charge of opportunism sticks to some proposals, which came forward while fires still burned at the Pentagon and World Trade Center.

Nadine Strossen: My greatest fear is that too many will embrace the government's call to give up some freedom in return for greater safety, only to find that they have lost freedom without gaining safety. That is the lesson of every recent actual or metaphorical war.

They involve powers law enforcement could not win from a rational, deliberative Congress.

The laws balancing surveillance and privacy could be updated—rationally and in light of new technology, our tradition of privacy from government, and the Fourth Amendment. But when the last terrorist has died or renounced violence, the privacy protections taken hastily from American citizens in the coming days are not likely to be restored. This truly just war against terrorism may take a generation. Mopping up the carnage to privacy may take many decades longer than that. ■

Jim Harper is editor of Privacilla.org, a Web-based privacy-policy think tank.

Losing the Fourth and First

Nat Hentoff

We may lose the need for a magistrate to give police a warrant for any kind of search. Also, federal law enforcement officials want to allow an investigator to search a suspect's home without immediately notifying the target of the search. In J. Edgar Hoover's day, that was called a "black bag job." It is totally unconstitutional, and it should be criminally illegal.

Then there's the First Amendment. In the Gulf War, the government managed to tie the hands of the press totally. In other words, practically no information came out except from the government. By contrast, in the much more dangerous Vietnam War, there was a great deal of free reporting and as a result of that, people began to understand what was going on and there were political changes. As Justice Hugo Black said in the Pentagon Papers case, it's *especially* when you're in a war situation and people are going to die that the press has to tell people what's going on.

And that's just a few freedoms under attack. Most Americans have only a rudimentary understanding of their own rights, because those rights are taught so badly in the schools. Therefore, they don't care much what other people's rights are. Because of the terror of the attacks, about 70 percent of the public is *willing* to give away their rights in the interests of security. All in all, it's a very bleak picture. ■

Nat Hentoff is a syndicated columnist and author of numerous books on civil liberties.

Every Step We Take

Robert Higgs

The American people may well be witnessing the death of their right to privacy, not with their usual whimper but with their ill-considered, too-hasty approval after the New York and Pentagon bangs.

The government has declared war on "terrorism," but because terrorists assume many guises and operate in many places, the only way to ensure that no terrorist escapes notice is to watch everyone, everywhere. Lacking the patience and the wit to focus its surveillance on only the most likely suspects, the government will regard all of us as potential terrorists or as their potential providers, unwitting perhaps, of aid and comfort. Our communications by ordinary mail, telephone, fax, and e-mail will be scrutinized or at constant risk of scrutiny; our homes and places of business will be searched or at constant risk of search; our personal contacts, financial affairs, and travel by airliner, train, and ship will be closely monitored and restricted. To borrow the lyrics of a once-popular song: Every step we take, every move we make, they'll be watching us.

Of course, once people have been subjected to such

thoroughgoing government surveillance, all relations between the government and the public are transformed. Whether the rulers be revolutionary despots or democratically elected officials, every citizen knows that "they" know all about him and his affairs, and hence no one dares to step out of line. In such a situation, the sociopolitical system will gravitate ineluctably toward totalitarianism.

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Bye-Bye, Bill of Rights

David Kopel

In the short run, Fourth and Fifth Amendment liberties face the greatest perils. While Attorney General John Ashcroft has performed very well on many fronts, in his relationship with the FBI he is, unfortunately, following in the footsteps of the attorneys general from the Clinton and the first Bush administrations. He's doing nothing to restrain the FBI's ever-escalating demands for the creation of a surveillance state.

Over the longer course of war, almost every part of the Bill of Rights will come under assault. Centralizers will attempt to further undermine the Tenth Amendment. Already, the gun prohibition lobbies are claiming that gun shows must be destroyed in order to fight terrorism. Note, by the way, that the McCain-Lieberman gun show bill before Congress is not just about background checks on some gun show sales. The McCain-Lieberman bill has so many sweeping restrictions, the violation of any one of which is a felony, that it would be legally reckless for anyone to operate any gun show if McCain-Lieberman were law. The issue really isn't background checks, but whether gun shows should continue to exist.

Besides threats to particular liberties, friends of traditional American values—namely freedom, privacy, and justice—should keep their eyes on two transcendent issues during wartime. First, the effort to replace our checks and balances and our system of federalism with unreviewable central executive power. Second, the tendency of people to suppress their own willingness to think freely, and to lash out at those who do not similarly self-suppress.

David Kopel is research director of the Independence Institute, in Golden, Colorado.

Farewell to Anonymity

Declan McCullagh

So far, politicians are targeting privacy and anonymity. National I.D. cards are being taken far too seriously. Oracle CEO Larry Ellison told a San Francisco TV station: "We need a national ID card with our photograph and thumbprint digitized and embedded in the ID card." Perhaps eyeing a lucrative support contract, Ellison volunteered to provide the software "absolutely free."

The likely result: Cops arresting any American who refuses to show a surveillance-enabled I.D. on demand. (Previously the concept arose, in less dramatic form, when anti-immigration zealots in Congress unsuccessfully tried to encode fingerprints, Social Security numbers, and other personal information into everyone's driver's license.)

That's not the only retread of a bad idea from the 1990s. In a floor speech, Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) called for a global ban on privacy-protective encryption products that don't have "back doors" that would allow government surveillance. Gregg plans to introduce a bill in October. No word yet on how those crypto-mavens in the U.S. Congress plan to convince Osama bin Laden and company to use FBI-certified spyware.

Another item on the FBI wish list is about to come true: The Senate has already approved a bill—by a 97–0 vote—that lets police conduct some forms of Internet surveillance without a court order.

The outlook isn't entirely bleak. Liberty has found some surprising, if uncertain, champions in the Congress. We should be heartened that members of both major parties are starting to ask for more time to weigh these proposals. The Bush folks had said, generously, that three days would be more than enough.

Declan McCullagh is the Washington bureau chief of Wired News (wired.com) and a contributor to wartimeliberty.com.

Two Kinds of Rights

Roger Pilon

As the Declaration of Independence says, the main busi-

Paul M. Weyrich: Perhaps you may want to trust the government to have access to your innermost views. But what do you suppose will happen when you determine that the government has become too repressive and it must be replaced?

ness of government is to secure rights, but legitimate government can't do it by any means. It can't violate rights in the name of securing them.

That frames the issue. Between those boundaries—and given a world of uncertainty—the devil is in the details. Governments too restrained leave rights exposed. By contrast, societies that trade liberty for security, as Ben Franklin noted, end often with neither.

Thus, the government's war against terrorism implicates two kinds of rights—the rights governments are instituted to secure, and those they must respect in the process. At this writing, it appears that the terrorist attacks of September 11 resulted from a massive government failure to protect rights of the first kind. Predictably, friends of government are now saying that an undue regard for rights of the second kind led to that failure. That may be true, but it may also be special pleading. Were agencies prohibited from talking to each other in the name of privacy? Or did they simply fail to coordinate efforts? Those are the kinds of questions that need answering.

At this juncture, therefore, it's difficult to say which civil liberties are most at risk. Certainly, as September 11 demonstrated, the liberties we created government to secure are at risk. But can we better secure them and remain free? Yes, if we act smartly. Above all, whether with surveillance or searches or due process, judicial oversight must be preserved—for citizens and noncitizens. It's the final safeguard for liberty. ◘

Roger Pilon is vice president for legal affairs and director of the Center for Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute.

Presumed Guilty

Glenn Reynolds

No liberty is in danger so long as we are willing to preserve it. But I think the biggest danger is to the presumption of innocence. Defensive precautions against terrorism involve, unavoidably, a presumption of guilt. That's tolerable at airport security checks, but the trick will be to keep this approach from infecting all of law enforcement—even in areas that have nothing to do with terrorism.

To judge by the proposed legislation before Congress as I write, that infection is already happening at the Justice Department. ◘

Glenn Reynolds is a professor of law at the University of Tennessee, and writes for the Web site InstaPundit.com.

Three-Time Losers

Harvey A. Silverglate

There are three areas in which civil liberties are most vulnerable. One is in the area of domestic surveillance. One change that has a good chance of occurring is the monitoring of individuals on the basis of something other than probable cause. I also expect that there will be an attempt to give the Department of Justice the authority to monitor individuals even without a court order under circumstances that Justice, in its wisdom, deems appropriate. I think the DOJ will take advantage of the current crisis to not only get authority to monitor different kinds of communications modalities, such as the Internet, but also to lower the relatively strict standards that govern wiretapping.

The probable increase in racial and ethnic profiling of tan-skinned people and the maintenance of a different set of standards for them as opposed to "Americans" is also very worrisome. When an unwise rule is applied only to a disfavored or minority group, there is no substantial social

pressure to get that bad rule repealed. It's only when that rule is applied to all of us that really horrendous rules get repealed.

I am also concerned about moving into an atmosphere where there will be coercive displays of patriotism required of citizens in order for them to avoid various kinds of discrimination—or even violence and threats of violence.

Harvey A. Silverglate is co-author of The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on American College Campuses (Free Press).

Less Freedom, Less Safety

Nadine Strossen

My greatest fear is that too many members of the public will embrace the government's call to give up some freedom in return for greater safety, only to find that they have lost freedom without gaining safety. That is the lesson of every recent actual or metaphorical war.

In the Gulf War, we saw unprecedented restrictions on freedom of the press. Subsequent studies showed that the restrictions were not justified by any actual security concerns, but rather were designed largely to shield our government from criticism. Still, efforts are now under way to impose even greater restrictions on media coverage in the current crisis.

In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, our government has been exercising pervasive surveillance over millions of innocent communications, through dragnet systems including record-breaking numbers of wiretaps, the Carnivore program for intercepting all communications that pass through certain Internet service providers, and the Echelon global electronic surveillance system. Nonetheless, the Justice Department continues to seek even more expansive surveillance powers, which would sweep in even more innocent communications, with even less judicial oversight.

In the War on Drugs, many rights-curtailing measures fall disproportionately on members of racial minorities who fit stereotypical "profiles." Likewise, in the stepped-up "War on Terrorism," the most endangered rights will probably be those of ethnic and religious minorities who are targeted not because of individualized suspicion, but only because of stereotypes. The most beleaguered are likely to be Arabic or Islamic individuals who are not American citizens.

Nadine Strossen, a professor at New York Law School, is president of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Nowhere to Hide

Paul M. Weyrich

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is the most at risk. The government will challenge our right to be shielded from unreasonable search and seizure by trying to obtain the keys to our encrypted communications. That way, at will and without a warrant, they will be able to read our e-mail and other documents.

Ah, you say, I have nothing to hide, so why do I care? In this era of political correctness where the ordinary practices of today become the crimes of tomorrow, it is dangerous to have that view. Perhaps you may want to trust the government to have access to your innermost views. But what do you suppose will happen when you determine that the government has become too repressive and it must be replaced? What do you suppose will happen to you when governmental officials find out your views before you have had a chance to act upon them?

Paul M. Weyrich is president of the Washington, D.C.-based Free Congress Research and Education Foundation.

The Decline and Fall of the First Global Economy

How nationalism, protectionism, and collectivism spawned a century of dictatorship and war.

Brink Lindsey

THE BUZZWORD IS OF RELATIVELY recent vintage, but the reality it describes is nothing new. Globalization, by any other name, was in full swing a century ago. Indeed, it was remarkably advanced, even by contemporary standards.

In 1913, merchandise trade as a percentage of gross output was about 12 percent for the industrialized countries. They did not match that level of export performance again until the 1970s. The volume of international capital flows relative to total output reached heights in the early 20th century that have not been approached since. In that earlier time, capital flows out of Great Britain rose as high as 9 percent of gross domestic product; by contrast, the seemingly staggering current account surpluses of Japan and Germany in the 1980s never surpassed 5 percent of GDP. It is fair to say that much of the growth of the international economy since World War II has simply recapitulated the achievements of the era prior to World War I.

The first world economy was made possible by the staggering technological breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution. Most obviously, new forms of transportation toppled the age-old tyranny of distance. For inland transport, the significance of the railroad is difficult to overestimate. In 1830, a journey from New York to Chicago took three weeks; just one generation later, in 1857, that same trip took only two days. The second half of the 19th century witnessed an explosion of railroad construction around the world. Great Britain's railway mileage more than tripled, from 6,621 miles in 1850 to 23,387 miles in 1910; over the same period, mileage in Germany grew nearly tenfold, from 3,637 miles to 36,152 miles; the United States, astonishingly, experienced a nearly thirtyfold increase, from 9,021 miles in 1850 to 249,902 miles in 1910. The railroads knitted countries into truly integrated national markets and facilitated the penetration of foreign goods from port cities into the interior.

Meanwhile, another technology was uniting those national markets into a global whole. Although the steamship was first developed early in the 19th century, further innovations in subsequent decades—the screw propeller, steel hulls, the compound engine—transformed what had been primarily a river vessel into cheap and reliable ocean transport. The effect on freight costs was nothing short of spectacular: An index of freight rates along Atlantic export routes fell by 70 percent in real terms between 1840 and 1910.

The Industrial Revolution's burst of technological creativity thus demolished the natural barriers to trade posed by geography. At the same time, it created entirely new possibilities for beneficial international exchange. In the core of the new global economy, the factories of the North Atlantic industrializing countries pumped out an ever-widening stream of manufactured goods desired around the world. Those factories, in turn, relied on access to cheap natural resources and raw materials. And in the less advanced periphery of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, new technologies allowed those natural resources and raw materials to be grown or extracted more cheaply than ever before.

The Industrial Revolution's burst of technological creativity demolished the natural barriers to trade posed by geography.

So arose the initial grand bargain on which the first global division of labor was based: The core specialized in manufacturing, while the periphery specialized in primary products. For Great Britain, the first industrial power, manufactured goods constituted roughly three-quarters of

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its exports. The sprawling United States, on the other hand, straddled both core and periphery. The urbanized East took industrialization to a new level and carried America past Great Britain in economic development. The West, meanwhile, followed the path of other temperate "regions of European settlement" (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina) and specialized in the production of grains, meats, leather, wool, and other high-value agricultural products. Finally, the South roughly followed the tropical pattern of development, focusing on such products as rubber, coffee, cotton, sugar, vegetable oil, and other low-value goods.

While far-flung foreign trade is as old as human history, this was something new. No longer was such commerce a marginal matter, limited to a few high-value luxuries. Now, for the first time, specialization of production on a worldwide scale was a central element of economic life in all the countries that participated. Between 1870 and 1913, exports as a percentage of national income doubled in India and Indonesia, and more than tripled in Thailand and China. Japan's transformation was especially dramatic. After Commodore Perry's black ships arrived in 1858, Japan turned from almost total isolation to free trade. In a mere 15 years, its export share multiplied an astonishing 70 times, to 7 percent of gross domestic output.

Industrial Counterrevolution

But it was not to last. The global economic order that arose and flourished in the waning years of the 19th century was swept away by the great catastrophes of the 20th: world wars, the Great Depression, and totalitarian dictatorships. Only in the past couple of decades has a truly global division of labor been able to reemerge.

What happened? Why did the first episode of globalization end so badly? These questions are more than mere historical curiosities. They have a vital bearing on the controversies that swirl around globalization today. According to contemporary critics of global trade, the sad fate of that earlier epoch reveals the inherent dangers of unregulated markets. Then as now, they argue, economic forces had slipped all proper constraints; then as now, the ideology of laissez-faire ran roughshod over social needs. The consequences in the past were tragic: The excesses of unchecked markets, with their brutality and volatility, ultimately triggered the catastrophes of totalitarianism, depression, and war. Today, the resurgence of utopian faith in markets threatens a new cycle of disasters.

William Greider adopts this line in his book *One World, Ready or Not* (1997). In particular, Greider cites the historical analysis of Karl Polanyi, author of the 1944 book *The Great Transformation*. Polanyi argued that the catastrophes of his time could ultimately be traced back to the evils of laissez-faire: "The origins of the cataclysm lay in the utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system." Greider contends that we are once again on the road to ruin: "Today, there is the same widespread conviction that the marketplace can sort out large public problems for us far better than any mere mortals could. This faith has attained almost religious certitude, at least among some governing elites, but, as Polanyi explained, it is the ideology that led the early twentieth century into the massive suffering of global depression and the rise of violent fascism."

Greider is by no means alone in resurrecting Polanyi: He has emerged in recent years as a kind of patron saint of globalization's critics. George Soros notes his intellectual debt in his acknowledgments at the beginning of *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*. Dani Rodrik, of Harvard University and author of *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*, refers to him frequently. John Gray, a professor at the London School of Economics who wrote *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*, titled his first chapter "From the Great Transformation to the Global Free Market."

These arguments are an almost perfect inversion of the truth. The tragedies of the 20th century stemmed, not from an over-reliance on markets, but from a pervasive loss of faith in them. In the wake of the Industrial Revolution and the arrival of mechanized mass production, a powerful new idea began to take hold and remake the world in its image. That idea, reduced to its bare essence, was that the economic revolution of industrialization both enabled and required a revolution in social organization: the eclipse, partial or total, of markets and competition by centralized, top-down control. The intellectual and political movements spawned by this idea emerged in the last quarter of the 19th century and utterly dominated the first three-quarters of the 20th. This 100-year historical episode, though composed of diverse and widely varying elements, possesses enough coherence to merit a name, and the one I suggest is the Industrial Counterrevolution. (I first discussed the idea of an Industrial Counterrevolution in "Big Mistake" [February 1996], which focused exclusively on the American history of this global phenomenon.)

The Industrial Counterrevolution was protean, and in its many guises captured minds of almost every persuasion. It transcended the conventional left-right political

The free traders' sunny cosmopolitanism all too quickly gave way to a very different vision of the international scene—one of rival nations, rival races, pitted in fundamental and irresolvable conflict.

spectrum: Both progressives who welcomed the social transformations wrought by industrialization and conservatives who feared them were united in their calls for a larger state with expanded powers. The Industrial Counterrevolution swept up reformers and revolutionaries, the religious and the anticlerical, social activists and big businessmen, workers and capitalists. The political forms that bore its imprint were many and varied: the welfare and regulatory state; the mixed economy of social democracy; the business-led associative state; Keynesian fine-tuning; the Galbraithean new industrial state; the developmental states of the Third World; and the totalitarian states, whether communist, fascist, or Nazi.

The name "Industrial Counterrevolution" is fitting on two levels. First, as a matter of historical development, the movements grouped together under this common heading were both inspired by and reacting against the economic and social transformations effected by industrialization. In the United States and Europe, the centralizing impulse first began to register during the 1870s, just as modern technological society was bursting onto the scene. In later-developing countries, the ideologies of centralization almost invariably supplied the matrix for modernization.

Second, in analytical terms, the common intellectual thread that runs through all of these movements—namely, the rejection or demotion of market competition in favor of top-down control—represents a direct assault on the principles of social order that gave rise to industrialization and are truest to its full promise. Of course, the partisans of the Counterrevolution thought quite the opposite: They believed that their political programs and industrialization rode together on the same great wave of history.

It is impossible to understand the collapse of the first world economy, or the rise of the present one, except in relation to the Counterrevolution's centralizing impulses. For the story of globalization and the story of the Industrial Counterrevolution are mirror images of one another: In the early decades of the 20th century, the rise of collectivism spelled the demise of the global economy; in the past couple of decades, the loss of faith in the collectivist dream has allowed globalization to resume its course.

Here I examine the first half of that cycle: the destruction of the global economy by the forces of runaway centralization. In particular, I want to focus on the critical decades leading up to World War I. For it is clear enough that the final breakdown of international economic integration during the calamitous 1930s was an extended consequence of the Great War. What is less well known is how the collectivist delusion helped to lead the world toward that awful conflict—and thus toward all the horrors that followed in its wake.

Cobden's Dream

At the midpoint of the 19th century, a very different future appeared to be on the horizon. The liberal creed of cosmopolitanism, free trade, and peace promised to define the shape of things to come. As in so much else, Great Britain led the way. In the decades after Waterloo, it made gradual but significant progress in dismantling its protectionist policies. Seizing this political opening, a pair of textile manufacturers, Richard Cobden and John Bright, led their country to bolder action, organizing the Manchester-based Anti-Corn Law League into a national mass movement of middle-class urban interests against the landed elite. Their seven-year campaign achieved victory in 1846 with the

repeal of the Corn Laws and the elimination of all duties on imported grains.

From its testing ground in Great Britain, free trade began to spread into continental Europe. The major breakthrough, again featuring Richard Cobden, was the Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860 between Great Britain and France. A flurry of European trade agreements followed. Building on its tradition of the *Zollverein*, a customs union of German states, the newly unified Germany steadily pursued a liberal trade policy. By the mid-1870s, average tariffs on manufactured goods had fallen to between 9 and 12 percent on the continent—compared to effective rates of 50 percent or more at the close of the Napoleonic Wars.

The liberal champions of free trade did not view their cause solely or even primarily as a commercial matter. In their view, free trade carried profound implications for the whole field of international relations. Free trade, they believed, could pave the way toward a new and modern form of international order—one that would replace the pointless and destructive dynastic struggles foisted upon the people by kings and aristocracies. Peaceful cooperation among nations, not mere economic efficiency, was the grand prize for which they strove.

Cobden outlined this larger vision in a speech in Manchester on the eve of the Corn Laws' repeal: "I believe that the physical gain will be the smallest gain to humanity from the success of this principle....I have speculated, and probably dreamt, in the dim future—ay, a thousand years hence—I have speculated on what the effect of the triumph of this principle may be....I believe that the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires; for gigantic armies and great navies—for those materials which are used for the destruction of life and the desolation of the rewards of labour—will die away; I believe that such things will cease to be necessary, or to be used when man becomes one family, and freely exchanges the fruits of his labour with his brother man."

Cobden and other Victorian free traders are often faulted for their naive faith in the healing powers of commerce. And indeed, some in that camp did fall prey to the facile assumption that major wars were no longer possible in the new global economy. But Cobden himself, as the above passage makes clear, was under no illusions as to the difficulty of subduing the powers of destruction. He saw the task as a monumental and centuries-long project.

However tempered by realism, though, the Cobdenite vision of the future was clearly optimistic. Though the challenges ahead were still daunting, the remaking of the world had begun. The sterile futility of conflict among nations was slowly but surely giving way to interdependence, peace, and prosperity—with commerce the steam-powered engine of that beneficent change.

Nationalism, Socialism, and Tariffs

The free traders' sunny cosmopolitanism all too quickly gave way to a very different vision of the international scene. As the Industrial Counterrevolution began to gather momentum, the prospect of a world at peace started to recede. A new prospect, dark and menacing, came in its stead to the fore—one of rival nations, rival races, pitted in fundamental and irresolvable conflict, engaged in a grim and merciless struggle for supremacy or submission. This radical and ruinous shift of perspective did not merely coincide with the spreading enthusiasm for centralization and top-down control; rather, the two developments were interconnected and mutually reinforcing.

First, the momentum of the Industrial Counterrevolution pushed inexorably toward expanding the power of the national state. This was true despite the fact that the most potent and influential of all the counterrevolutionary movements—Marxist socialism—was deeply internationalist in orientation. Marx himself was thoroughly cosmopolitan: He conceived of the coming socialist revolution and the workers' paradise it would establish as worldwide phenomena that would overwhelm dynastic, national, and racial distinctions as thoroughly as they did the historically fundamental distinctions of class. He had no interest in augmenting the strength of current states, which he condemned as tools of capitalist oppression.

Recall, however, that Marx's great contribution was a powerful theoretical and historical conception of *why* collectivism was inevitable. Marx had little to say as to *how* collectivism would actually work in practice, and he had even less influence over the ultimate course of events. The worldwide proletarian uprising never came, and in the absence of that hoped-for event, the overwhelming drive toward centralization that Marx did so much to engender fastened itself upon the instrumentality at hand: the national state.

Consider, for example, the fate of the German Social Democrats, Europe's first socialist party of political significance. Their original leaders were orthodox Marxists who preached international revolution, not domestic statism. Over time, though, electoral success spoiled the Social Democrats' doctrinal purity. In the 1890s, after their stunning gains in the Reichstag precipitated Bismarck's fall and the repeal of the repressive Socialist Law, new leaders

In a world of free trade, citizens of one country can exploit the benefits of a broader division of labor through peaceful commerce. But in a world where severe trade restrictions are endemic, such benefits can be attained only through warfare.

like Georg Vollmar and Eduard Bernstein pushed the party toward "revisionism," or support for gradual reform and cooperation with the existing state. The domestication of the Social Democrats culminated in August 1914, when every single party member in the Reichstag voted in favor of war credits for the Kaiser's army.

Many other emerging centralizing movements embraced an expanded national state from the outset. Edward Bellamy, American author of the utopian fantasy *Looking Backward* and a major influence on subsequent Progressive and New Deal intellectuals, called his philosophy "nationalism" to distinguish it from Marxist-style socialism. In Great Britain, the Fabians advocated incremental reform and a political strategy of "permeation," or working through established political parties. And in Germany, the conservative, Bismarckian "state socialists" were unabashed in their devotion to the national state. Characteristic in this regard was the economist Gustav Schmoller, who proclaimed the state to be "the most sublime ethical institution in history."

Furthermore, the growing enthusiasm for national economic planning was fundamentally at odds with the new international division of labor. After all, if centralized decision making is more efficient than markets, why allow international markets to persist? Inflows and outflows of goods and capital, if unregulated, will only disrupt the best-laid plans of the national authorities. What good is it to set minimum wages in a particular industry if the workers who are supposed to benefit then lose their jobs because of competition from cheaper foreign goods? Or what if the authorities seek to encourage downstream processing industries, but the domestic producers of the raw inputs prefer exporting them at a high price to selling them cheaply at home?

A new collectivist case for protectionism thus began to emerge. If a nation's economic life is to come under central control, that control must extend to the nation's connections with the outside world. In outlining his vision for a "nationalist" utopia, Edward Bellamy was quite clear on this point: "A nation simply does not import what its government does not think requisite for the general interest. Each nation has a bureau of foreign exchange, which manages its trading. For example, the American bureau, estimating such and such quantities of French goods necessary to America for a given year, sends the order to the French bureau, which in turn sends its order to our bureau. The same is done mutually by all the nations." George Bernard Shaw, a Fabian pamphleteer as well as a playwright, took a similar view. In *Fabianism and the Fiscal Question*, he wrote that if protectionism means "the deliberate interference of the State with trade" and "the subordination of commercial enterprise to national ends, Socialism has no quarrel with it." On the contrary, Shaw asserted, socialism must be considered "ultra-Protectionist." And in Germany, the state socialists waged a blistering attack on free trade as a part of their larger campaign against laissez-faire and "Manchesterism."

It is true that many partisans of centralization, especially on the Left, resisted the protectionist logic of their position. Free trade appealed to their internationalist sympathies; also, a low-tariff policy was generally associated with cheap bread and thus was widely considered favorable to the working class. (How times have changed!) The momentum of centralization, though, generally prevailed over tradition and class interests. In the end, the fortunes of collectivism and protectionism rose together. In the middle of the 19th century, enlightened opinion was almost uni-

formly in favor of free trade; by the end of the century, protectionism had once again become intellectually respectable.

With that renewed respectability came a significant retreat from free trade in actual practice. In Germany, the breakthrough came in 1879, with Bismarck's "iron and rye" tariff. In France, the Meline Tariff raised duties to the equivalent of 10 to 15 percent for agricultural goods and over 25 percent for industrial products. Tariffs also climbed in Sweden, Italy, and Spain during the 1880s and 1890s. In the United States, tariff rates rose during the Civil War and stayed high for the rest of the century. They got a further boost with the McKinley Tariff of 1890. In Latin America, rates of protection ascended steadily during the final quarter of the 19th century. Tariffs in Russia were punishingly high and never came down.

The direct impact of resurgent protectionism on the new world economy should not be overestimated. Average tariff rates rose, but were still relatively modest on the eve of World War I: under 10 percent in France, Germany, and Great Britain; between 10 and 20 percent in Italy; between 20 and 30 percent in the United States; and between 20 and 40 percent in Russia and Latin America. Such nontariff barriers as quotas or exchange controls were barely in evidence. Protectionist measures did slow the pace of globalization (and blocked it for certain regions and sectors), but did not stop it. Despite increasing obstacles, the internationalization of economic life flourished in the decades before World War I.

Nevertheless, the drift toward protectionism did contribute to a new international atmosphere of conflict and tension. In Bellamy's utopia, national planners could somehow control their imports and exports without so much as a cross word from abroad. But in reality, restrictions on trade inevitably set nations against each other. When governments interfere with their citizens' ability to do business with the citizens of other nations, they must expect such acts to be seen abroad as provocative. They are, after all, reducing the prosperity that other countries might otherwise enjoy. High tariffs in one country throttle export industries abroad; embargoes deprive other nations of needed raw materials, products, and capital. These restrictions can be matters of life and death if the dependence on foreign products or markets is great enough.

The implications of trade barriers for international relations are thus enormous. In a world of free trade, citizens of one country can exploit the benefits of a broader division of labor through peaceful commerce. But in a world where severe trade restrictions are endemic, such benefits can be attained only through warfare—through defeat of the foreign sovereignty that blocks access to the desired products or markets. Free trade makes war economically irrational; protectionism, carried far enough, makes it pay.

These grim implications were abundantly clear in the circumstances of the late 19th century. The enriching possibilities of international specialization had never been greater, and were increasing daily due to incessant technological breakthroughs. At the same time, however, countries were beginning to close their borders. While the level of protectionism was still within reasonable limits, it was widely believed that barriers would only increase with time. Making matters worse, the great powers of the core were rapidly consolidating political control over the periphery in a mad rush of imperial land-grabs. The world appeared to be fracturing into great imperial blocs, each one more or less closed off from the others. It seemed as though the countries that controlled these blocs would reign supreme; those without enough territory to combine self-sufficiency with prosperity would be doomed.

Under these conditions the Cobdenite cosmopolitan vision looked hopelessly outmoded. Expanding opportunities for a far-flung division of labor were not ushering in an age of peace; on the contrary, they were propelling nations toward inevitable and bloody conflict. What had wrought this dreadful turn of events? It was the expectation that countries would find it in their interest to close their economies to the outside world. And what created that expectation? It was the growing sense that national economic planning was the wave of the future. The drive toward centralization had thus transformed the legacy of the industrial revolution from that of world peace to one of a world at war. It is indeed fitting to call this transformation an Industrial Counterrevolution in international affairs.

The result was that collectivism and militarism became mutually reinforcing. Aggressive nationalism was needed to secure and safeguard the full blessings of collectivism; at the same time, collectivization was needed to render the nation fit for military conflict. From this basic feedback loop issued the great tragedies of dictatorship and total war.

Shadow of the Reich

The links that connected the dreams of central planning and the nightmares of the 20th century were forged, to a greater or lesser extent, by many of the disparate movements of the Industrial Counterrevolution. But those who pursued this fatal logic most explicitly and consistently,

World War I was no accident. It was a product of the ideas of the Industrial Counterrevolution: ideas of centralization that merged into statism, ideas of statism that merged into aggressive nationalism.

and to the most powerful historical effect, were the state socialists of Imperial Germany. The Bismarckian program integrated all the necessary elements: collectivism in domestic affairs, protectionism in commercial policy, and aggressive nationalism and militarism in matters of state. William Dawson, a sympathetic English observer of the German scene, distilled the essence of the new *Reich* into a single sentence: "As State Socialism is the protest of Collectivism against Individualism, so it is the protest of Nationality against Cosmopolitanism."

The leading theorists of state socialism, the so-called *Kathedersozialisten,* were fervent supporters of belligerent nationalism. Gustav Schmoller, perhaps their brightest light, was emphatic in his rejection of the Cobdenite vision. For him, the international sphere was inevitably and properly a zone of never-ending conflict: "All small and large civilized states have a natural tendency to extend their borders, to reach seas and large rivers, to acquire trading posts and colonies in other parts of the world. And there they constantly come into contact with foreign nations, with whom they must, quite frequently, fight. Economic development and national expansion, progress in trade and an enhancement of power are in most cases inextricably connected."

Adolf Wagner, another prominent voice, was even more truculent. Wagner asserted that the "decisive fact" in international relations was "the principle of power, of force, the right of power, the right of conquest." Weaker nations, he contended, would meet "the fate of all lower organisms in the Darwinian struggle for existence."

Schmoller and Wagner called upon Germany to steel itself for the coming struggle of nations. To that end, they were ardent supporters of a protectionist trade policy. Wagner, in particular, stressed the link between national security and protecting German agriculture. Dependence on foreign food supplies could be crippling in the event of war, he noted; furthermore, protectionism would preserve the large peasantry that supplied the backbone of a strong army.

The two scholars also urged an aggressive program of territorial expansion. Germany, they wrote, needed more space to ensure a high standard of living in an age of vast and autarkic empires—and to settle the country's rapidly increasing population. Schmoller called for creating a German country with 20 to 30 million inhabitants in southern Brazil. Wagner dismissed "idle pretensions like the American Monroe Doctrine" as an obstacle to German colonization. In addition to overseas adventures, Schmoller and Wagner foresaw a dominant German role in European affairs. Both expressed the view that German hegemony should extend throughout what came to be referred to in pan-German circles as *Mitteleuropa.*

To assume its rightful station, Germany would have to rely ultimately on its military prowess. Schmoller wrote that "the high standard of living of the English worker would be unthinkable without Great Britain's sea power," and that Germany should follow her example by building a strong navy. Wagner, for his part, called military power "the first and most important of all national, and may I add, of all economic necessities." The army, he claimed, was "a truly productive institution" because of "the connection between national might, security, honor and economic development and prosperity."

The writings of these renowned professors served as a blueprint for Germany's disastrous course toward war. They and others like them fostered the intellectual climate in which Germany's leaders made the fateful decisions

that crushed liberalism domestically and heightened tensions internationally. They stoked the strident and reckless nationalism that intoxicated the German people and had them spoiling for war. They saw and made the connection between collectivism at home and belligerence abroad.

And they provoked imitators. The German example and threat served to promote collectivist domestic policies in Great Britain under the banner of "national efficiency." German influence extended in similar fashion to British attitudes about international affairs. The "national efficiency" push for social reform was inextricably connected with a newly assertive imperialism.

The connections ran in both directions. On one hand, social reforms were touted as strengthening the empire. Lord Rosebery, a Liberal imperialist and leading spokesman of the "national efficiency" cause, argued, "An Empire such as ours requires as its first condition an imperial race —a race vigorous and industrious and intrepid." But, he continued, "in the rookeries and slums which still survive, an imperial race cannot be reared." Meanwhile, the empire was defended as an essential support for working-class living standards. Nobody put this case more bluntly than Joseph Chamberlain, champion of the protectionist "tariff reform" movement: "If tomorrow it were possible, as some people apparently desire, to reduce by a stroke of the pen the British Empire to the dimensions of the United Kingdom, half at least of our population would be starved."

And so in Britain, as in Germany, collectivism at home went hand-in-hand with an expansionist foreign policy. The Cobdenite vision of peaceful coexistence and nonintervention yielded to one of great empires locked in a "struggle for existence"—a phrase that Joseph Chamberlain employed repeatedly in his speeches. The British Empire—which had been acquired, in the famous phrase, in "a fit of absence of mind"—came to be seen as a prized asset, even a life-or-death necessity. And its health demanded the centralization of economic decision making. In other words, the conditions of external competition required the suppression of competition internally.

Britain, unlike Germany, did not succumb to economic nationalism. Chamberlain led a well-organized campaign to convert the empire into a vast, protectionist trading bloc, and for a time it appeared he would succeed. In the end, though, he lost the campaign for working-class support to the New Liberals, who combined imperialism and social reform with continued allegiance to free trade. The election of 1906, a sweeping victory for the Liberals, effectively squelched the tariff reformers.

Their near-success, though, was enough to stoke fears abroad that the British Empire would soon be closed to outsiders. This prospect contributed to Germany's spiraling economic nationalism and militarism, which in turn provoked an accelerating British military buildup. (The latter prompted Winston Churchill's famous quip, "The Admiralty had demanded six ships: the economists offered four and we finally compromised on eight.") As Britain and Germany armed to the teeth, it became increasingly likely that some chance event would spark a major confrontation. On June 28, 1914, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife ignited that spark.

It is customary to view World War I as a tragic accident —a senseless war about nothing in particular, or at least nothing that makes any sense to us now; a war that nobody wanted but into which all were dragged by a ruinous system of entangling alliances. It is true that the outbreak of war at that particular time did hinge on a maddening and heartbreaking sequence of contingencies. But at a deeper level, the war was no accident. It was a product of the ideas of the Industrial Counterrevolution: ideas of centralization that merged into statism, ideas of statism that merged into aggressive nationalism, ideas of nationalism that merged into plans for military conquest.

And its baleful consequences extended far beyond the awful slaughter in the trenches. The Russian Revolution and the rise of fascism were direct outgrowths of the Great War. Less obviously, so was the Great Depression. Postwar efforts to reconstitute the old international economic system, in particular the gold standard, were enacted under the badly distorted and volatile conditions of the time, leading ultimately to disastrously deflationary monetary policy in the United States and Europe. In the 1930s, the combination of economic catastrophe and predatory totalitarianism —both aftershocks of the Great War—spelled the end of the first global economy and precipitated a second global war. So ended the descent into fire and chaos that began with the guns of August.

The Contradictions of Collectivism

When critics of global trade claim that the phenomenon's first, failed episode should be seen as a warning against reckless faith in markets, they are standing history on its head. In truth, the first global economy was destroyed by the antithesis of economic liberalism—namely, the misbegotten dream of central planning and social engineering that inspired the Industrial Counterrevolution in all its variants. The collectivist delusion was flatly incompatible

When critics of global trade claim that the phenomenon's first, failed episode should be seen as a warning against reckless faith in markets, they are standing history on its head.

with an international division of labor: When the former was ascendant, the latter could not survive. For collectivism invariably attached itself to the ready means of the nation-state, and once so ensconced, it helped to stoke aggressive, beggar-thy-neighbor nationalism. In a world of centralized and increasingly regimented states whose interests could not help but clash, conflict was inevitable. And when war came, its terrible fury hatched new monsters: ruinous economic disruption and barbaric totalitarianism. The gossamer bonds of trust and mutuality that sustain a global marketplace had no chance against such an onslaught.

In the years after World War II, there was a partial reconstruction of the international economy, led by the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. But the continued ascendancy of the Industrial Counterrevolution made true globalization impossible. After all, the bulk of the world's population, located in the Communist bloc and the so-called Third World, lived under rabidly collectivist regimes that rejected the very idea of an international market economy. Only in the past couple of decades has the counterrevolutionary momentum exhausted itself in disillusionment and failure. And as overweening state control has receded—with the opening of China, the fall of the Soviet empire, and many Third World countries' abandonment of state-dominated models of development—market connections have been reestablished. The death of the dream of centralized control has marked the rebirth of globalization.

But the collectivist past continues to cast long shadows. The move toward more liberal policies has occurred amidst the ruins of the old order, and so has had to contend with grossly deformed conditions. The transition, as a consequence, has been wrenching and often brutally painful. And that transition is far from complete. The world economy is littered still with the wreckage of discredited systems, constraining the present and obscuring the future. Life has left the old regime, but the dead hand of its accumulated institutions, mindsets, and vested interests continues to weigh heavily upon the world. Against that dead hand—which includes, among other things, the ideologically distorted misunderstanding of globalization's past—the cause of freedom must contend for many decades to come. ◼

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Post-Scarcity Prophet

Economist Pa[illegible] Romer on growth, technological change, and an unlimited human future.

Interviewed by Ronald Bailey

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"One of the 25 most influential Americans," pronounced *Time*. "His ideas may just revolutionize the study of economics." *Newsweek* included him in its roster of "The Century Club," a "list of 100 people for the New Century." He is a perennial short-lister for the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. His work has been lauded by business guru Peter Drucker and Nobel-winning economist Robert Solow. He is the STANCO 25 Professor of Economics at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution. He was recently elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

As one of the chief architects of "New Growth Theory," Paul Romer has had a massive and profound impact on modern economic thinking and policymaking. New Growth Theory shows that economic growth doesn't arise just from adding more labor to more capital, but from new and better ideas expressed as technological progress. Along the way, it transforms economics from a "dismal science" that describes a world of scarcity and diminishing returns into a discipline that reveals a path toward constant improvement and unlimited potential. Ideas, in Romer's formulation, really do have consequences. Big ones.

Before New Growth Theory, economists recognized that technology contributed substantially to growth, but they couldn't figure out how to incorporate that insight into economic theory. Romer's innovation, expressed in technical articles with titles such as "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth" and "Endogenous Technological Change," has been to find ways to describe rigorously and exactly how technological progress brings about economic growth. As Robert Solow told *Wired* in 1996, "Paul single-handedly turned [the study of economic growth] into a hot subject."

The 46-year-old Romer, son of former Colorado Gov. Roy Romer, received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago in 1983, six years after earning a B.S. in physics at the same school. Before joining Stanford's faculty in 1996, he taught at a number of schools, including the University of Chicago, the University of Rochester, and the University of California at Berkeley. He and his wife, Virginia Langmuir, a medical doctor, live in Portola Valley, California, and have two children.

In June, **reason** Science Correspondent Ronald Bailey interviewed Romer poolside at his house, which overlooks a huge expanse of rolling ranchland owned by Stanford University. For more information on Romer's theories, turn to his Web site, www.stanford.edu/~promer.

reason: In terms of real per capita income, Americans today are seven times richer than they were in 1900. How did that happen?

Paul Romer: Many things contributed, but the essential one is technological change. What I mean by that is the discovery of better ways to do things. In most coffee shops these days, you'll find that the small, medium, and large coffee cups all use the same size lid now, whereas even five years ago they used to have different size lids for the different cups. That small change in the geometry of the cups means that somebody can save a little time in setting up the coffee shop, preparing the cups, getting your coffee, and getting out. Millions of little discoveries like that, combined with some very big discoveries, like the electric motor and antibiotics, have made the quality of life for people today dramatically higher than it was 100 years ago.

The estimate you cite of a seven-fold increase in income—that's the kind of number you get from the official statistics, but the truth is that if you look at the actual change in the quality of life, it's larger than the number suggests. People who had today's average income in 1900 were not as well off as the average person today, because they didn't have access to cheap lattés or antibiotics or penicillin.

reason: New Growth Theory divides the world into "ideas" and "things." What do you mean by that?

Romer: The paper that makes up the cup in the coffee shop is a thing. The insight that you could design small, medium, and large cups so that they all use the same size lid—that's

Photo courtesy Hoover Institution

an idea. The critical difference is that only one person can use a given amount of paper. Ideas can be used by many people at the same time.

reason: What about human capital, the acquired skills and learned abilities that can increase productivity?

Romer: Human capital is comparable to a thing. You have skills as a writer, for example, and somebody—**reason**—can use those skills. That's not something that we can clone and replicate. The formula for an AIDS drug, that's something you could send over the Internet or put on paper, and then everybody in the world could have access to it.

This is a hard distinction for people to get used to, because there are so many tight interactions between human capital and ideas. For example, human capital is how we make ideas. It takes people, people's brains, inquisitive people, to go out and find ideas like new drugs for AIDS. Similarly, when we make human capital with kids in school, we use ideas like the Pythagorean theorem or the quadratic formula. So human capital makes ideas, and ideas help make human capital. But still, they're conceptually distinct.

reason: What do you see as the necessary preconditions for technological progress and economic growth?

Romer: One extremely important insight is that the process of technological discovery is supported by a unique set of institutions. Those are most productive when they're tightly coupled with the institutions of the market. The Soviet Union had very strong science in some fields, but it wasn't coupled with strong institutions in the market. The upshot was that the benefits of discovery were very limited for people living there. The wonder of the United States is that we've created institutions of science and institutions of the market. They're very different, but together they've generated fantastic benefits.

When we speak of institutions, economists mean more than just organizations. We mean conventions, even rules, about how things are done. The understanding which most sharply distinguishes science from the market has to do with property rights. In the market, the fundamental institution is the notion of private ownership, that an individual owns a piece of land or a body of water or a barrel of oil and that individual has almost unlimited scope to decide how that resource should be used.

In science we have a very different ethic. When somebody discovers something like the quadratic formula or the Pythagorean theorem, the convention in science is that he can't control that idea. He has to give it away. He publishes it. What's rewarded in science is dissemination of ideas. And the way we reward it is we give the most prestige and respect to those people who first publish an idea.

reason: Yet there is a mechanism in the market called patents and copyright, for quasi-property rights in ideas.

Romer: That's central to the theory. To the extent that you're using the market system to refine and bring ideas into practical application, we have to create some kind of control over the idea. That could be through patents. It could be through copyright. It might even be through secrecy. A firm can keep secret a lot of what it knows how to do.

reason: A formula for Coca-Cola?

Romer: Yes. Or take a lot of the things that Wal-Mart understands about discount retailing. They have a lot of insight about logistics and marketing which they haven't patented or copyrighted, yet they can still make more money on it than other people because they keep it closely held within the firm. So for relying on the market—and we do have to rely on the market to develop a lot of ideas—you have to have some mechanisms of control and some opportunities for people to make a profit developing those ideas.

But there are other stages in the development of ideas. Think about the basic science that led to the discovery of the structure of DNA. There are some kinds of ideas where, once those ideas are uncovered, you'd like to make them as broadly available as possible, so everybody in the world can put them to good use. There we find it efficient to give those ideas away for free and encourage everybody to use them. If you're going to be giving things away for free, you're going to have to find some system to finance them, and that's where government support typically comes in.

In the next century we're going to be moving back and forth, experimenting with where to draw the line between institutions of science and institutions of the market. People used to assign different types of problems to each institution. "Basic research" got government support; for "applied product development," we'd rely on the market. Over time, people have recognized that that's a pretty artificial distinction. What's becoming more clear is that it's actually the combined energies of those two sets of institutions, often working on the same problem, that lead to the best outcomes.

reason: We hear a lot of complaints from academicians about how business and corporations are taking over university research.

Romer: I think it's important to have a distinct realm of science and a distinct realm of the market, but it's also very good to have interaction between those two. One of the best forms of interaction is for people who work in one to move into the other.

The people in university biology or biochemistry departments complain when they see somebody go on leave from the university and start a company that's going to develop a new drug. That's not the way it was done 30 years ago. But this is the best way to take those freely floating, contentiously discussed ideas from the realm of science and then get them out into the market process, because the reality is that there are virtually no ideas which generate benefits for consumers if there's not an intervening for-profit firm which commercializes them, tailors them to the market, and then delivers them. You can point to examples where things jump right from science to benefits for the consumer, but that's the exception, not the rule.

reason: Do we run the risk of ruining science by involving it too much in the market?

Romer: Well, some people would say that everything should be patented. The danger is that if you went that far, you could actually slow the discovery process down. There are very good theoretical reasons for thinking that market and property rights are the ideal solution for dealing with things, but there are also strong theoretical reasons for thinking that in the realm of ideas, intellectual property rights are a double-edged sword. You want to rely on them to some extent to get their benefits, but you want to have a parallel, independent system and then exploit the tension that's created between the two.

reason: What are those theoretical reasons?

Romer: It traces back to this multiple use I was describing for ideas vs. single use for things. The miracle of the market system is that for objects, especially transformed objects, there's a single price which does two different jobs. It creates an incentive for somebody to produce the right amount of a good, and it allocates who it should go to. A farmer looks at the price of a bushel of wheat and decides whether to plant wheat or plant corn. The price helps motivate the production of wheat. On the other side, when a consumer has to decide whether to buy bread or corn meal, the price allocates the wheat between the different possible users. One price does both jobs, so you can just let the market system create the price and everything works wonderfully.

With ideas, you can't get one price to do both things. Let me give an extreme example. Oral rehydration therapy is one of those few ideas which did actually jump immediately from science to consumer benefit. It's a simple scientific insight about how you can save the life of a child who's suffering from diarrhea. Literally millions of lives have been saved with it. So what price should you charge people for using it?

Because everybody can use the idea at the same time, there's no tragedy of the commons in the intellectual sphere. There's no problem of overuse or overgrazing or overfishing an idea. If you give an idea away for free, you don't get any of the problems when you try and give objects away for free. So the efficient thing for society is to offer really big rewards for some scientist who discovers an oral rehydration therapy. But then as soon as we discover it, we give the idea away for free to everybody throughout the world and explain "Just use this little mixture of basically sugar and salt, put it in water, and feed that to a kid who's got diarrhea

"There are virtually no ideas which generate benefits for consumers if there's not an intervening for-profit firm which commercializes them, tailors them to the market, and then delivers them."

because if you give them pure water you'll kill them." So with ideas, you have this tension: You want high prices to motivate discovery, but you want low prices to achieve efficient widespread use. You can't with a single price achieve both, so if you push things into the market, you try to compromise between those two, and it's often an unhappy compromise.

The government doesn't pay drug companies prizes for coming up with AIDS drugs. It says they've got to incur these huge expenses, but then if they succeed, they can charge a high price for selling that drug. This has generated a lot of progress and we're prolonging the life of people with AIDS, but the high price is also denying many people access to those drugs.

reason: Over the broad sweep of human history, technological progress and economic growth were painfully slow. Why has it sped up now?

Romer: It's so striking. Evolution has not made us any smarter in the last 100,000 years. Why for almost all of that time is there nothing going on, and then in the last 200 years things suddenly just go nuts?

One answer is that the more people you're around, the better off you're going to be. This again traces back to the fundamental difference I described before. If everything were just objects, like trees, then more people means there's less wood per person. But if somebody discovers an idea, everybody gets to use it, so the more people you have who are potentially looking for ideas, the better off we're all going to be. And each time we made a little improvement in technology, we could support a slightly larger population, and that led to more people who could go out and discover some new technology.

Another answer is that we developed better institutions. Neither the institutions of the market nor the institutions of science existed even as late as the Middle Ages. Instead we had the feudal system, where peasants couldn't decide where to work and the lord couldn't sell his land. On the science side, we had alchemy. What did you do if you discovered anything? You kept it secret. The last thing you'd do was tell anybody.

reason: How did the better institutions come about?

Romer: That's one of the deep questions. There's some kind of political process, some group decision process, which leads to institutions. If you go back to what I said a minute ago about the advantages of having many people, you can see that there's a tension here. There are huge benefits to having more people and having us all interact amongst ourselves to create goods and to share ideas. But you face a really big challenge in trying to coordinate all of those decisions, because if you have large numbers of independent decision makers who aren't coordinating their actions appropriately, you could get chaos. Think about millions of drivers with no rules of the road, no agreement about whether you drive on the left or the right.

So where do these institutions come from? It was a process of discovery, just as people discovered how to make bronze. They also discovered ways to organize political life. We can use democratic choice as an alternative to, say, a hereditary system of selecting who's the king. What's subtle here is, How do those discoveries get into action? It's not like a profit motive in a firm that brings software to market. There was a process of persuasion when somebody discovered that, hey, this would be a better way for us to organize ourselves. So we had political and economic thinkers—Locke, Hobbes, Smith—who managed to persuade some of their peers to adopt those institutions.

So institutions came from a combination of discovery, persuasion, adoption—and then copying. When good institutions work somewhere in the world, other places can copy them.

reason: Many economic historians are critical of New Growth Theory. Economic growth is a modern phenomenon, yet it appears that New Growth Theory should apply equally to the Roman Empire or Ming China as well as the modern world.

Romer: I think that's a caricature of the theory. New Growth Theory describes what's possible for us but says very explicitly that if you don't have the right institutions in place, it won't happen. If anything, it was the old style of theory which made it sound like technological change falls from the sky like manna from heaven, regardless of how we structure our institutions. This new theory says technological change comes about if you have the right institutions, which we have had.

reason: So what's the crucial difference between Ming China and modern economies today?

Romer: Ming China was very advanced. It had steel. It had clocks. It had movable type. Yet it was far from generating either the modern institutions of science or the institutions of the market.

The market and science differ in their treatment of property rights, but they're similar in that they rely on individuals who are free to operate under essentially

no constraints by authority or tradition. It took a special set of historical circumstances to persuade people that things could work if you freed people, within certain institutional constraints, to pursue their own interests. This is where Ming China was very far away from modern notions.

Part of the answer to this big question about human history has been the acceptance of relatively unfettered freedom for large numbers of individuals. It's something we just take for granted, but if you described it in the abstract to the people of 50,000 years ago, they would never believe it could possibly work. They were conditioned to systems where there was the head man or the chief, and as numbers got at all large, there was a sense that you had to have somebody with kind of dictatorial control. It was a deep philosophical insight and deep change in the whole way we viewed the world to tolerate and accept and then truly celebrate freedom. Freedom may be the fundamental hinge on which everything turns.

reason: You often cite the combinatorial explosion of ideas as the source of economic growth. What do you mean by that?

Romer: On any conceivable horizon—I'll say until about 5 billion years from now, when the sun explodes—we're not going to run out of discoveries. Just ask how many things we could make by taking the elements from the periodic table and mixing them together. There's a simple mathematical calculation: It's 10 followed by 30 zeros. In contrast, 10 followed by 19 zeros is about how much time has elapsed since the universe was created.

reason: Of all those billions of combinations, the vast majority are probably going to be useless. So how do you find the useful ones?

Romer: This is why science and the market are so important for this discovery process. It's really important that we focus our energy on those paths that look promising, because there are many more dead ends out there than there are useful things to discover.

You have to have systems which explore lots of different paths, but then those systems have to rigorously shut off the ones that aren't paying off and shift resources into directions which look more promising. The market does this automatically. The institutions of science could tip either way. In American science, we have vigorous competition between lots of different universities, which leads to a kind of marketplace of ideas. You can think of other institutions of science that aren't nearly as competitive. In the national laboratories, people are in the worst case civil servants: They're there for life, and there's always more funding for them.

reason: Does New Growth Theory give us some new insights on how to think about monopolies?

Romer: There was an old, simplistic notion that monopoly was always bad. It was based on the realm of objects—if you only have objects and you see somebody whose cost is significantly lower than their price, it would be a good idea to break up the monopoly and get competition to reign freely. So in the realm of things, of physical objects, there is a theoretical justification for why you should never tolerate monopoly. But in the realm of ideas, you have to have some degree of monopoly power. There are some very important benefits from monopoly, and there are some potential costs as well. What you have to do is weigh the costs against the benefits.

Unfortunately, that kind of balancing test is sensitive to the specifics, so we don't have general rules. Compare the costs and benefits of copyrighting books versus the costs and benefits of patenting the human genome. They're just very different, so we have to cre-

"It's not the people from the developing world who are making the argument that Nike is a threat to their sovereignty or well-being. It's people in the United States."

ate institutions that can respond differentially in those cases.

reason: You have written, "There is absolutely no reason why we cannot have persistent growth as far into the future as you can imagine." Your Stanford colleague, the biologist Paul Ehrlich, disagrees. He believes that economic growth is an unsustainable cancer that is destroying the planet. How would you go about convincing people like Ehrlich that they are wrong?

Romer: Paul seems singularly immune to being convinced. He has been on the wrong side of these issues, so I wouldn't set that as my standard of persuading anybody. However, if I took a neutral observer who might listen to me and Paul, there's a pretty easy way to explain why I'm right and why Paul misunderstands. You have to define what you mean by growth. If by growth you mean population, more people, then Paul is actually right. There are physical limits on how many people you can have on Earth. If we took peak population growth rates from the '70s at 2 percent per year, you can only sustain that for a couple of hundred years before you really run into true physical constraints.

reason: I would remind you that Ehrlich said that there would be billions of people dying of starvation in the 1980s.

Romer: He got the potentials wrong and the time frame wrong, but it's absolutely true that population growth will have to come to zero at some point here on Earth. The only debate is about when.

Now, what do I mean when I say growth can continue? I don't mean growth in the number of people. I don't even mean growth in the number of physical objects, because you clearly can't get exponential growth in the amount of mass that each person controls. We've got the same mass here on Earth that we had 100,000 years ago and we're never going to get any more of it. What I mean is growth in *value*, and the way you create value is by taking that fixed quantity of mass and rearranging it from a form that isn't worth very much into a form that's worth much more. A canonical example is turning sand on the beach into semiconductors.

reason: What do you make of the recent protests against globalization?

Romer: When we were describing the broad sweep of human history, we talked about how hard it was for people to get used to the idea of freedom. There was another kind of adjustment that we had to make as well: We had to get used to the idea of the market, and especially market exchange among anonymous strangers. People often contrast this with the institutions of the family, where you've got notions of sharing and mutual obligation. Many of us have a deep psychological intuition rooted in our evolutionary history that makes us feel warmly toward the family and suspicious of large, impersonal, anonymous market exchange. I think that emotional impulse is part of what some of the environmental ideologues draw on when they attack the whole market system and corporations and modern science and everything.

This is a case where human psychology that was attuned to a hunter-gatherer environment is just a little bit out of touch with a new world that's much more interconnected, much more interactive, and in many ways a much more satisfying and rich human experience. You can idealize life in a hunter-gatherer society, but nobody wants to go through the frequent death of a child—a very common experience for almost all of history that has been reduced a phenomenal degree within human memory.

reason: How would you convince protestors of the benefits of globalization?

Romer: First, just look at the facts. The protestors are amazingly ignorant about what has happened in terms of, say, life expectancy. Life expectancy for people in the poorest countries of the world is now better than life expectancy in England when Malthus was so worried about it.

Then you look at the variation of experience between the poor countries that have done best and the ones that have done worst, and try to see what the correlations are. Which countries did best? Was it the countries that adopted the market most strongly, embraced foreign investment, and tried to adopt property rights? Or was it the other countries?

The evidence again is clear. One of the untold stories about the '80s and '90s was the really dramatic turnaround in the developing world that took place on this issue. If you track the legislative history on foreign investment, you see a colonial legacy, even as late as the '70s, where developing countries have laws designed to keep corporations out. Then there's this dramatic turnaround as they saw the benefits that a few key economies received by inviting in foreign investment. It's not the people from the developing world who are making the argument that Nike is a threat to their sovereignty

or well-being. It's people in the United States. The people in the developing world understand pretty clearly where their self-interest lies.

reason: What about boosting economic growth in developed countries?

Romer: For Europe and the United States, I think we need to be thinking very hard about how we can restructure our institutions of science. How can we restructure our system of higher education? How can we make sure that it has the benefits of vigorous competition and free entry, especially of those bright young people who might do really different kinds of things? We should not assume that we've already got the ideal institutions and the only thing we need to do is just throw more money at them.

Unfortunately, I think a lot of countries have a long way to go to catch up to the state where we are in the United States—and I'm not that happy about where we are in the United States. Many European countries simply have not recognized the power of competition between institutions. So they have monolithic, state-run university systems. That stifles competition between individual researchers and slows down the whole innovative process. They also need to let people move more flexibly from the university into the private sector and back. This is something that many countries watching venture capital start-ups have become aware of, although they've been slower to get their institutions to adjust.

reason: In your recent paper on doing R&D, you said you think it would be possible to raise the growth rate from its average rate of 1.8 percent between 1870 and 1992 to 2.3 percent.

Romer: Well, I was trying to set a goal. When you're thinking about the future, you never really know what we're going to discover, but I think there's a reason to set for ourselves an ambition of trying to raise the rate of growth by half a percent per year. The United States achieved about 0.5 percent a year faster growth than the U.K. did since 1870, so we've got a historical precedent for creating institutions which lead to better innovation of the market and strengthen science significantly. We should aim for that kind of improvement again.

reason: Why would that be important?

Romer: As you accumulate these growth rates over the decades, we get much higher levels of income. That lets us deal more effectively with all the problems we face, whether it's making good on commitments to pay for people's health care as they get older, preserving more of the environment, or providing resources so that people can have time to be out of the labor market for a certain period of time—when they're raising kids, say, or when they want to take an extended sabbatical.

Income per capita in 2000 was about $36,000 in year 2000 dollars. If real income per person grows at 1.8 percent per year, by 2050 it will increase to $88,000 in year 2000 purchasing power. Not bad. But if it grows at 2.3 percent per year, it will grow to about $113,000 in year 2000 purchasing power.

In today's purchasing power, that extra $25,000 per person is equal to income per capita in 1984. So if we can make the choices that increase the rate of growth or real income per person to 2.3 percent per year, in 50 years we can get extra income per person equal to what in 1984 it had taken us all of human history to achieve.

One policy innovation, for example, that would boost the growth rate would be to subsidize universities to train more undergraduate and graduate students in science and engineering. Also, you could give graduate students portable fellowships that they could use to

"Because the economics of ideas are so different from the economics of markets, we're going to have to develop a richer understanding of non-market institutions, science-like institutions."

pay for training in any field of natural science and engineering at any institution the students choose. Graduate students would no longer be hostage to the sometimes parochial research interests of university professors. Portable fellowships would encourage lab directors and professors to develop programs that meet the research and career interests of the students.

reason: What's next in New Growth Theory? Any conceptual breakthroughs on the horizon?

Romer: Because the economics of ideas are so different from the economics of markets, we're going to have to develop a richer understanding of non-market institutions, science-like institutions. This is going to be a new endeavor for economics.

reason: Do you think that there is a big role for economic historians in helping uncover this richer theory?

Romer: History is an absolutely essential body of evidence, because you can't make inferences about long-run trends using year-to-year or quarter-to-quarter data.

reason: There is a growing movement against technological progress around the world. Why is there this negative reaction to technological progress and what can we do about it?

Romer: You're a big believer in turmoil and creative destruction when you're early in life, because you can knock down the old and create your new thing. Once you achieve a certain level, you tend to get very conservative and try to slow the gales down, because they might blow you over. So I think we have to seriously commit ourselves to maintaining space for new entrants and for young people. That's one way to keep the process going. Another is to do what scholars have always done: to proselytize, to dissect incoherent arguments.

I think we'll be able to maintain this dynamic of progress that was unleashed a couple centuries ago. There will be small setbacks and a lot of noise and complaining, but the opportunities and the benefits are just too great to pull back.

reason: Could anything stop economic growth and technological progress?

Romer: Even if one society loses its nerve, there'll be new entrants who can take up the torch and push ahead. Mancur Olson talks about Caldwell's Law, the idea that no nation has remained truly innovative for very long. Look at Italy, and then Holland, and then the U.K., and then the United States. The pessimistic interpretation is that nobody can keep the process going. The optimistic interpretation is, Yes, you can, but somebody else comes along and the progress moves from one place to the next.

We've seen individual societies where conservative or reactionary elements suppress the changes. What has protected us in the past is that there were other nations that could try new paths. You didn't have the same political dynamic everywhere at once.

If in the far future we reach a situation where there really is truly global political control—if multinational institutions grow more powerful over economic affairs so that there is imposed uniformity across all nations—then there'd be a loss of diversity. And if the reactionary elements got in control of those institutions, there'd be no room for the new entrant, the upstart, to adopt new ideas. But that's a pretty distant and unlikely prospect. ◻

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2001 Nights

The end of the Orientalist critique

Charles Paul Freund

IN THE AFTERMATH of September 11, Edward Said, one of the country's more elegant intellects, listened carefully to the anguish and anger pouring through the American media, and five days after the murders published a commentary about what he had heard. Writing in Britain's *The Observer,* the distinguished critic of literature and politics discerned "the vague suggestion that the Middle East and Islam are what 'we' are up against."

Obviously, Prof. Said missed the fact that broadcast and cable news anchors actually curtailed early speculation that the attacks had their origin in the Middle East or in Islam. Why? Because, as ABC's Peter Jennings told his viewers, "We don't want to create a 'mindset' here." Said apparently missed the numerous interviews with ordinary Arab-Americans expressing their own appalled grief at the attacks, appearances that enabled them to represent themselves through the media rather than be misrepresented by them. He seems to have missed the lightning-fast circulation by e-mail of the now-famous letter by Afghan-American Tamin Ansary, which rapidly created sympathy among its millions of recipients for common Afghans.

Said must have missed even the enormous pains taken by elite news outlets and public figures, especially President George W. Bush, to distinguish between the "true" Islam of peace, as they often characterized it, and any variant that could justify and celebrate acts of mass murder. In his address to Congress, Bush actually assumed the role of Islamic theologian, pronouncing any such violent variant to be "blasphemy." Even Ibrahim Hooper, head of the controversial Council on American-Islamic Relations and a tireless critic of the American media's portrayal of Arabs and the Middle East, pronounced himself "surprised," and pleasantly so, at the coverage.

But not Said. Passages of his *Observer* essay were certainly eloquent and insightful. Not only was he horrified by the carnage, but he was revolted by the perpetrators and by any ideas, religious or political, that might be used to justify such acts. Yet when it came to the American side of his story—what he saw as the vaguely anti-Islamic reaction to the attacks—he slipped back into the familiar litany of the Orientalist critique. That is, he suggested that the media had failed to critique American policy, instead reacting monolithically to "the Middle East and Islam." He implied that the media had portrayed them stereotypically and contentiously. That's not surprising, perhaps, since Said himself established that critique almost 25 years ago. His famous book *Orientalism* (1978) was a harsh interpretation of the West's attitude toward just these matters, and the critique he established has since dominated the intellectual appraisal of the West's political and cultural relationship to the Muslim world and other peoples of the East.

Yet the critique doesn't fit the aftermath of the attacks at all. Xenophobia remains a significant issue, but if anything, the irenic reaction to the attacks suggests that among American political and media elites, Orientalism has become a dead letter. Indeed, the attack and its aftermath suggest much more. They illustrate that, while the Orientalist critique deserves credit for its earned successes, it deserves to be judged anew for some no less significant sins. Above all, the attack itself reveals the florescence of a cultural phenomenon that has received almost no attention from anyone.

That phenomenon is dangerous, is widespread, and has long been developing beneath the radar and the contempt of the intellectual establishment. It portrays the West falsely and contentiously. It is, as one scholar has termed it, the other side of the Orientalist coin: Occidentalism.

What was Orientalism? Said identified it in his foundational work as the political, cultural, and intellectual system by which the West has for centuries "managed" its relationship with the Islamic world. The central stratagem of this process has been reductionist misrepresentation. In brief, according to Said and the army of intellectual critics and journalists who have come in his wake, Orientalism transforms the East and its people into an alien "Other." That Other—usually a Dark Other—was in every way the inferior of the West: unenlightened, barbarous, cruel, craven, enslaved to its senses, given to despotism, and, in general, contemptible. Having established an Eastern Other in these degrading terms, the West emerged at the center of its self-serving discourse as, by obvious contrast, enlightened and progressive.

The Orientalist critique found supporting evidence for its severe charges in texts from the Crusades to contemporary foreign-policy debates. Shakespeare, in *King Lear*, expresses Orientalism. Sir Richard Burton's famous translation of the *Arabian Nights* into a pseudo-archaic language that nobody ever spoke was 16 volumes of Orientalism. British imperial anthropology texts were Orientalist. What else? Old studio paintings of nude odalisques, slave markets, and eunuchs; desert travel literature; novels by Diderot, Montesquieu, Kipling, and H. Rider Haggard; a mass of specialized historiography; Maria Montez movies; the whole world of academic, "authoritative" Orientalist studies; anything having to do with Sinbad the Sailor; and even Henry Kissinger's ideas for resolving the Israeli-Arab impasse.

All of it, and a great deal more about literature, politics, food, and fashion, was studied as part of the immense edifice of Orientalist misrepresentation and degradation.

Was the critique valid? Even in its simplest form, it often was. Western treatments of the East regularly portrayed it as merely exotic, primitive, and inferior. The West's encounter with the East was not only imperial or mercantile; it was teleological, imputing to itself the purpose of enlightening and civilizing the East. Of course, citing self-serving imperialist stupidities is not a particularly great achievement nor necessarily relevant, but the Orientalist critique often paid itself off with close readings of contemporary political and cultural texts, arguing that imperialist stupidities had transmuted into postcolonial subtleties no less damaging. Whether these critiques were always correct is not relevant here; the point is that the project began as a constructive and often useful challenge to a family of ingrained cultural tropes. To the degree that Orientalism was banished from American coverage of the September 11 murders, Said and his many followers can claim a certain degree of credit.

On the other hand, the practitioners of the Orientalist critique, having enjoyed an early triumph, have spent the past quarter-century obscuring its original power by marrying it to such fields as Lacanian psychoanalysis (in which, for example, racism becomes fetishism) or else reformulating its original argument on ever more trivial grounds. While Said and many of his early followers approached their subject as public intellectuals seeking to persuade a general audience, later practitioners have pursued the matter as academics, writing in thick postmodern jargon and producing works that sit unread on research library shelves. Significantly, Said attempted to add more nuance to the thesis in his 1993 work *Culture & Imperialism*, arguing that a simple, binary East vs. West approach to such complex issues is after all a reworking of the "us vs. them" imperial worldview. Nobody paid much attention to him. The result is a project that appears increasingly ossified, if not something worse.

For example, the curator for a recent traveling exhibit of American Orientalist antiques ("Noble Dreams, Wicked Pleasures") has closely examined the ways in which early ads for Camel cigarettes, the brief hoochy-coochy fad, and a single souvenir of the 1923 Shriners convention in Washington all express a "cavalier appropriation" of culture (in part because Shriners wear fezzes) and even signal a transfer of world power to the United States. Her argument assigns tendentious meanings to complex activities and signs, then locks them together as if cultural artifacts were so many jigsaw pieces. Another prominent critic claims that she is "othered" by the way Americans categorize what they eat. That is, dishes associated with India are exoticized as "Indian food," whereas American dishes claim the gustatory mainstream by being just "food." Her argument is a pointless misreading of conversational convenience, and ignores the fact that the American diet is the world's most inclusive. Other critics, at the project's extreme, deny that anyone from the West (the "so-called West") has any right at all to address any subject having to do with the ("so-called") East. This Kafkaesque view condemns whole hemispheres

of people to guilt, and is no better than the views of Europe's imperial Orientalists at their worst.

There is another problem, however—one more ominous for the project in the long run than triviality. These are the doubts that have surfaced—within the critique—about the ways in which the counter-Orientalist project may have approached much of its evidence. In one collection of portentous essays about Hollywood Orientalism, *Visions of the East: Orientalism in Film*, it occurs to the editors that while such films may well carry racist, fetishist, patriarchal, and imperial baggage for some audiences, these movies may have "other meanings and appeals for other audiences."

It is a simple enough matter to make a distinction between Islam as a community of believers, and Islamists as utopian revolutionaries.

Well, yes. In this case, the anthology's editors cite the legitimacy of gay camp readings of 1940s harem movies. In fact, there are as many ways to receive "Orientalist" movies as there are people to watch them. It would doubtless come as a complete surprise to the admirers of Ray Harryhausen's special-effects epics, such as *The 7th Voyage of Sinbad* (1958), or of such classics as the 1940 version of *The Thief of Baghdad*, that the pleasure they took from such films is a cultural crime. Rather, such films provided them an exit to wonder, and it is doubtful that watching Kevin Matthews battle sword-wielding skeletons in some way exoticized the Arab-Israeli conflict in the minds of any viewers.

The issue of art's multiple and shifting meanings is sometimes acknowledged, tacitly or openly, in the texts of the Orientalist critique, but it is never allowed to unravel the net of Western guilt. That is because all meanings lead to the supposed power that the consumer of Orientalist culture can experience through any given artifact. Take all those paintings of naked harem women in their baths, for example, or being sold as slaves. According to many of their critics, these paintings are so much soft-core pornography that served to eroticize the Islamic world, thus empowering the male Western gazers of the work. As Rana Kabani wrote in her 1986 work, *Imperial Fictions: Europe's Myths of Orient*, "Although Westerners claimed to be horrified by the slave-trade, depictions of it were coveted by a genteel bourgeois public. The image of the captive beauty appealed to patriarchal urges of domination, and to imperialistic urges more generally."

But was the expression of European power really the function of these paintings? That would have depended on who bought them and what use they made of them. Art historian Lynne Thornton notes that most of the original buyers of Orientalist paintings, whether of harems or horsemen or markets, appear to have been nouveau riche industrialists. For these consumers, the colorful, Romantic, and erotic images may have been little more than a portrait of intensity executed in a fashionable style, one that provided a contrast to their otherwise dull daily lives. If a subtext of power is supposed to be central to this body of work, then surely it is noteworthy that the Orientalist school of painting becomes completely unfashionable after World War I. In other words, just as European colonialist power in the Middle East reaches its apogee, you couldn't give these paintings away.

As for the vaunted eroticism of the paintings, it's certainly there. It's present in the slave market scenes and the harem portraits, just as the eroticism of the naked Venuses and Eves is present in the paintings of the Renaissance. The Orientalist critique has revealed the "Oriental" erotic by desacralizing the European art that portrays it, only to mystify the art all over again with a discourse of power. (Some critics harp so intensely on the fascination with harems and slaves that it is easy to forget that these were not Western inventions but Eastern institutions.) Yet even Freud admitted that sometimes a cigar was just a cigar, and it is truer yet that a naked woman is sometimes just a painting.

Still, suppose one successfully subtracted imperial consumer fantasies from the discourse of power created by the Orientalist critique. Who then would become the subject of that discourse? Obviously, it would be the practitioners of the critique itself, because their discourse would end up describing not the culture's original consumers, but rather the culture's contemporary interpreters. It would be, in other words, about the critics themselves and what they think they see in these paintings.

Thus, their interpretive narrative would cease to be about consumer power fantasies, and begin to be about critical submission fantasies. This narrative would no longer center on male Eurocentric superiority, as expressed in sexual terms, but instead on the intellectual's fear of insecurity and alienation, also as expressed in sexual terms. In sum, the Orientalist

critique would cease to describe a system that, it maintains, the West uses to "manage" its relationship with a despised East, and stand revealed as *being* a system used by critics to "manage" their relationship with a despised West.

But that's supposing one can subtract the consumer from the Orientalist trade. Sometimes one cannot. The case against the stereotyping of Arab TV characters as either violent or vulgar, for example—best made by Jack Shaheen in a plain-English study titled *The TV Arab* (1984)—is undeniable, and is an effective indictment of both the producers and the consumers of such stereotypes. But one doesn't require either Said or Lacan to make such a case; Shaheen mentions neither. By contrast, the Orientalist critique has built its imposing edifice on the problematic roles played by the "exotic" and the "erotic" in the West's imagination. To those critics, these are entrances to vicarious power over Islam, and exhibits of guilt. Those who actually consumed works steeped in the exotic and erotic, however, may have regarded them as exits from the ordinary, including the ordinary Middle East. The Orientalist cultural critique may well have begun with the rich narrative of the West's imperial fantasies. It may just as well be continuing with the equally rich fantasies of the academe.

However important the implications of the Orientalist critique of culture, its effect on Western political discourse has become more immediately consequential. We have already acknowledged at least one praiseworthy consequence that can be attributed, in part, to the critique: the banishing of negative stereotyping and tendentious demonizing from coverage and discussion of the mass murders in New York and Washington. But what has taken the place of stereotyping and demonization? Unfortunately, it has not been an understanding of the relationship between the West and the world from which the murderers emerged; it is, rather, a denial of any relationship at all. Indeed, it is a denial that the murderers have emerged from an identifiable world.

The murderers have regularly been portrayed by media and political figures as isolated fanatics whose actions and motives are at odds with mainstream Islam, which is invariably praised in fulsome terms. There is certainly no denying the many striking aspects of Islam, which in its 14 centuries has generated and nurtured a particularly appealing mystical tradition (Sufism), an enor-

Accuracy In Media **WHY THE BOJINKA BLACKOUT?** **www.aim.org**
By Reed Irvine

October , 2001

Two days after the Sept. 11 calamity, my attention was called to a story in an Australian daily that quoted Avelino Razon, the Philippines chief police superintendent, as saying that in 1995, they had discovered "Operation Bojinka," a plot to plant bombs in U.S. airliners and hijack others to crash them into buildings like the CIA headquarters. Razon said this was found on the laptop of Ramzi Yousef, organizer of the 1993 bombing World Trade Center bombing. He had fled, but his laptop was found in the quarters he shared with Abdul Murad, another bin Laden agent.

My column about this appeared on Internet news sites and a number of papers. It generated a lot of invitations to discuss Bojinka on radio talk shows. But the story was not picked up by a major U.S. newspaper until September 23, when the Washington Post published a report by four reporters it had sent to Manila to look into it. Their page-one report, continued on two pages inside, said that the Philippine police had found "a clandestine terrorist cell allied with Osama bin Laden" that was plotting "to plant bombs in a dozen American airliners and fly an airplane into the CIA headquarters." It said a Filipino investigator exclaimed as he watched the attack on the World Trade Center on TV, "It's Bojinka." He said, "We told the Americans everything about Bojinka. Why didn't they pay attention?"

Chief Police Superintendent Avelino Razon told the Philippine Daily Inquirer that the Philippine intelligence report was passed on to the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Joint Task Force on Terrorism. He said, "It was not given credibility. Otherwise, it could have prevented the destruction of the World Trade Center." He added, "Bojinka called for the hijacking of U.S. commercial airliners, bombing them or crashing them into several targets, including the CIA."

Yousef and Murad were prosecuted in New York by Dietrich Snell. He was quoted by the New York Daily News on Sept. 25 as saying that the prosecution focused on the plot to plant bombs on airliners, not on the plan to crash a plane into the CIA. The News also reported that in 1999, Murad offered to cooperate with prosecutors in return for a more lenient sentence. His best bargaining chip would have been more information about the plan to hijack and crash airliners, which had not figured prominently in the trial. We will never know what he had to offer, because U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White refused to consider it.

Despite the Washington Post story, other news organizations, including the New York Times and the Washington Times, have ignored the story. Howell Raines, executive editor of the New York Times, says they didn't report it because it was an old story, one they reported in 1995. That is all the more reason to bring it up now. Those at the CIA and FBI responsible for this huge intelligence failure should be replaced, but that won't happen if the media don't expose them. Howell Raines says that isn't necessary because their incompetence is well known. But the White House doesn't seem to know it.

Dale L. Watson, the FBI's counter-terrorism chief, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee in 1998, described Bojinka only as a plot to blow up "numerous U.S. air carriers." If he and others in the intelligence community had been thinking of the hijacking side of Bojinka, they might have reacted differently to a suspected terrorist from Algeria named Zacarias Moussaoui, who had applied to a Minnesota flight school for training on a Boeing 747 flight simulator. He wanted to learn how to steer the jumbo jet. He had no interest in learning how to land it. He was detained on August 17 for suspected visa violations. The Washington Post said, "Our intelligence groups studied him but had no context in which his odd request made sense." FBI and Justice Dept. lawyers refused to seek permission to search Moussauoi's hard drive.

That reveals the incompetence mentioned by Howell Raines. I have commended the Post for their story, and Raines commended both the Post and AIM for our enterprise. That suggests that the reason the Times and others haven't run the story is because the Post beat them to it.

mous and often breathtaking body of poetry, and a history of tolerance that, despite some notorious exceptions, is nonetheless a good deal more impressive than was Christendom's record prior to the secularization of Western societies.

But locating Islam's contemporary mainstream is not a simple task, and cannot be accomplished in the subordinate clause of a *Times* op-ed piece. That mainstream is a matter of continuing contention within the Islamic community, itself divided into major sects and riven by competing teachings. Indeed, the history of Islam, like the history of Christianity, can be read as a struggle over orthodoxy. Early in Islam's history, for example, orthodoxy was strongly influenced by the Greek rationalist texts being translated by Islamic scholars. Caliphs adhering to this rationalist Mu'tazilite tradition actually subjected fundamentalist theologians to an inquisition in an attempt to wipe them out. Today, a major contender for orthodoxy is the 250-year-old Wahhabi movement, a puritanical and confrontationist interpretation whose spread through the Islamic community, in the United States and elsewhere, is being underwritten by the wealth of the Saudi regime.

In any event, it is futile for the president, the attorney general, or *The Washington Post* to pronounce on Islam's mainstream; that is a pressing issue that Muslims themselves must now confront and determine. (Deciding for Muslims what the Koran means is in fact an aspect of true Orientalism.) Worse, the attempt by Western elites to define Islam actually obscures the situation in which the United States and the West find themselves. That is because one of the major factions contending for that mainstream has been the "Islamist" movement. This movement rejects secularism and conceives of Islam as a political ideology as well as a source of faith. An attempt to grapple with modernity, the movement dates back to the 1940s, and has achieved power in Iran and elsewhere. In recent decades, adherents in Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have adopted violent means to destabilize the current regimes and bring themselves to power. Their intent is to effect a utopian revolution in social values. The primary enemy of many Islamists is the United States, not only for its alliance with Israel, but because America's seductive and pervasive secular culture undermines their revolutionary goals.

Islamism is not a simple phenomenon; it takes many forms. But those who perpetrated the murders of September 11 are adherents, as are many of those who welcomed the news of so many American deaths, whether in open celebration or in a private sense of solidarity with the attackers. It is obviously vital for Americans—emphatically including American Muslims, hundreds of whom were killed in New York—to confront that form of Islamism that is not merely opposed to aspects of American policy, but has so utterly dehumanized the citizens of the West.

That is where the Orientalist political critique becomes significant. Its practitioners have spent a quarter-century sifting through the sins committed by the West against the East, a rich and often ugly lode. But the critique's point has never been to clarify and improve relations and mutual perceptions. For many critics, the point has been to condemn the West, often by dissecting its imagination. As for examining the East's imagination, to see if it too was cluttered with stereotypes, misconceptions, or other detrimental concepts, that simply was never a sustained part of the critique. Worse, if other scholars did inquire into the dehumanizing trends that may have been present in the East, those scholars were likely to be labeled "Orientalists," an epithet that eventually became tantamount to "racist," and which served to marginalize them in

Free Your Radio

Three liberties we've lost to the FCC.

By Jesse Walker

Most radio stations today are boring and homogeneous, chains of clones controlled by an ever-dwindling handful of focus-group-driven corporations.

Their programs are presumably meeting *somebody's* needs, and I wish them no ill. I have no desire to drive those two oxymorons, "classic rock" and "young country," from the air. I can coexist with "easy listening," with "adult contemporary," with even that unlistenable concoction called "smooth jazz." (That's like calling Scientology "smooth Judaism.") But what kind of musical desert contains *only* those brands of broadcasting?

A freer media landscape, shorn of such tight controls, is possible—one that would allow us greater freedom to choose, to create, and to escape.

Freedom to choose simply means more options: more radio formats, more TV channels, more film studios, more publishers. Market forces have already produced much media diversity, and were it not for the barriers erected by the Federal Communications Commission (among others), those forces would produce much more. Radio, in particular, is already very diverse, with more than 11,000 AM and FM stations in the United States and dozens of formats for listeners »

the world of respectable scholarship.

This has turned out to be an agenda with consequences. What makes those consequences worth pondering is what made the critique both pressing and valuable to begin with. That is, Orientalist issues were worth addressing not only for their own sake, but because the East-West encounter has been increasingly problematic for the United States and the nations of the East, with explosive political, military, economic, and cultural dimensions for them all.

If the critique could have provided a better conceptual framework for addressing those issues, it would have been the right critique at the right time. But if the critique merely devised a one-sided apologia about Western sins and sinners without addressing similar issues in the East, then it would have proved merely another adventure in failed left-intellectual rationalization. Worse, if the critique ended up marginalizing or even delegitimizing others who *did* attempt to address the East's potential problems, it would have left its subject in a poorer state than it found it. It would have helped shape a West debilitated by guilt about its past, yet with no useful framework for understanding those who hate Westerners enough to murder them *en masse*. Given acts of mass murder by persons whom Reuters News Service refuses to term "terrorists," given a president who seeks inclusiveness while surrounding himself with various controversial Muslim spokesmen, given an intellectual class here and abroad that has been suggesting empathy with mass murderers, the West's conceptual approach to this crisis is at least open to question.

Of course, there are outspoken critics of certain political and anti-Western trends in Islam, and many of them, like Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, have access to major media outlets. Some occupy distinguished academic chairs, and many have published extended inquiries into the principles and practices of Islamism. However, they are usually considered hostile to Islam by what has become the academic mainstream. Some critics of Islamic culture and society have indeed been given to sweeping generalizations and overstatements about the East, but then that is just as true of their West-bashing critics. The problem, as is apparent from the post-attack discussion about the East, is that they have been pushed from the intellectual center of the debate.

Take the case of Daniel Pipes. He is the editor of the *Middle East Quarterly*, and has published widely on Islamist issues—especially its anti-Western antipathy—even as he has fended off continuous personal attacks on his motives. Indeed, shortly after the murders in New York and Washington, *The Los Angeles Times* published excepts from 10 authors who had recognized the magnitude of the terrorist danger, and who had predicted, in some sense, such an event. Pipes, unlike any of his critics, made the list.

Yet in the weeks following the murders, the term "Islamism," never mind an understanding of the complex movement it described, was almost entirely absent from the ceaseless discussion. Why? Politically, the U.S. wished to avoid all mention of Islamism in the interests of coalition-building. Intellectually, confronting Islamism would run counter to the feel-good discussion about Islam that emerged from Western guilt. Yet it is a simple enough matter to make a distinction between Islam as a community of believers, and Islamists as utopian revolutionaries capable of mass murder. After all, Islamists have been killing people in Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Russia, and elsewhere for many years. They'd already murdered hundreds of Americans. Now they've slaughtered thousands more. Even so, it never entered the debate. The West's enemy remained "terror-

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ism," the tactic, not Islamism, the idea.

By contrast, many practitioners of the Orientalist critique have tended to dismiss the term "terrorist" as a usage of Western propaganda. Said himself wrote in *Orientalism* that "terrorist" was a label used to describe those persons unwilling to obey Israel's orders. After the fall of Soviet communism, Susan Sontag observed that the consumers of *Reader's Digest* turned out to have been better informed about the communist nightmare than were the readers of the more respected *The Nation*. Who was better prepared to understand what was happening on September 11: students of the Orientalist critique, or the readers of the scorned neo-Orientalists?

Orientalism, the systematic stereotyping and degradation of Easterners that dehumanized them in the eyes of the West, enabled the colonial powers not only to mistreat whole populations, but also, in some of the West's blackest moments, to slaughter them in horrifying numbers. What makes it possible to commandeer passenger planes filled with innocent travelers, including children, and use them as bombs to murder thousands of people in office buildings? It is a systematic stereotyping and degradation of Westerners that dehumanizes them, and makes their death a pious deed for some and a cause for celebration for others. It is *Occidentalism*.

The phenomenon of Islamic Occidentalism has received almost no attention from the academe, and less from the Orientalist critique. The term exists in academic discourse, but there is not even a consensus about its meaning. To some, it describes the process by which the West flatters itself in positive terms. For others, it is the process by which people of the East, especially the Far East, idealize the West and overlook its flaws. There are few scholars to whom the term suggests a process by which an Easterner might utterly misconceive the West and its citizens, much less do them an injustice.

One scholar who has begun to study Islamic Occidentalism, based on years of work with the Egyptian women's movement, is Dr. Nadje Al-Ali, a social anthropologist who teaches at the University of Exeter. Al-Ali is careful to note in her work that Occidentalism is not, in her view, the equal of Orientalism so much as a reaction against it. Only last April, Al-Ali organized a scholarly conference in Britain that attempted to provide the study of Occidentalism with some theoretical structure. In the meantime, she has written that the phenomenon is "part of a political ploy," in that "it uses available cultural categories to gain symbolic advantages for 'the self,' and to handicap 'the other.'" It has resulted in what she calls the construction of "an imperialist, corrupting, decadent and alienating West."

If you attach that description to an empowering eschatology and arm it with explosives, you end up with something very like an angry Islamism contemplating its "corrupting, decadent and alienating" enemies.

While a serious, sustained study of Occidentalism lies in the future, its content will not turn out to be a mystery. It draws on the same sources of belittlement and dehumanization from which hatreds—including Orientalism—have always drawn. Indeed, its outlines are visible in the documents of extreme Islamism.

For example, critics of Orientalism have generated an enormous literature addressing the West's reduction of the East in erotic terms. But the Occidentalist murderers and their celebrants have developed a parallel discourse that addresses Western women in terms of erotic corruption, immorality, and decadence. According to some news accounts, Osama bin Laden is reported to have been especially disturbed at the presence of American women soldiers in Saudi

to choose from. But for the most part, this is diversity without depth: an ether carved into a thousand niches, each only an inch deep.

Consider the state of country radio. Country is now the most popular format in the United States, with more than 2,600 stations devoted to it.

The most popular brand of country broadcasting is "young" country—that is, country divorced from its past. One typical station's TV commercials alternate grainy, black-and-white films of old folks square-dancing and playing hillbilly instruments (words on screen: "old country") with color footage of groups that look like rock bands (words on screen: "young country"). Yet most country stations won't play much traditional country music. In some towns, you're more likely to hear Merle Haggard or Johnny Cash on a punk-flavored college station than on the frequency theoretically devoted to country and western. And so country radio rules, but great reservoirs of excellent country music—new as well as old—are ignored or forgotten.

Freedom to create means more than that: not just the right to choose among 500 TV stations instead of three, but fewer barriers to setting up a station of your own; not just greater ease in joining the officially licensed elite, but the right to operate outside it.

Like the freedom to choose, the freedom to create is being withheld by an alliance of policymakers and professionals. »

Arabia, Islam's most sacred ground.

Critics of Orientalism have accused the West of drawing on negative imagery dating back to the Crusades in addressing contemporary political issues. But Occidentalists are capable of precisely the same rhetorical act. In fact, the murderers evoke the Crusades directly. Bin Laden's 1996 fatwa calling on Muslims to kill Americans actually refers to Americans without irony as "Crusaders." (In the wake of the September 11 attacks, President Bush referred to the developing anti-terrorism campaign as a "crusade," purportedly committing the sin of insensitivity. Bush unwisely used the term in its generic sense, but that somehow received more attention than has bin Laden's repeated use of the word as a specific historical accusation.)

The critics of Orientalism have charged that the West has traditionally portrayed Easterners in terms of cravenness, contrasting their supposedly boastful-but-cowardly natures, for example, to the stoic courage of Israeli troops. Yet bin Laden's documents are suffused with charges of American cowardice, based on the U.S. government's decisions to pull troops out of Beirut and Somalia following unexpected casualties. Public statements by Mullah Muhammed Omar, head of Afghanistan's Taliban, drew on the same trope when he accused Americans of lacking the bravery to come to that country.

The same critics of Orientalism have long accused the West of depicting authority in the East in terms of a distorted concept of "Oriental Despotism." There are entire studies of this one subject (the most exhaustive is Alain Grosrichard's 1979 work, *The Sultan's Court*). But Occidentalist notions of power in the West are not merely distorted; they are crazed. They are dominated by an obsessive conspiracism that sees hidden plots—usually Jewish plots—everywhere. While the Orientalist trope of despotism reduces the Easterner to a slavish figure unconcerned with his freedom or rights, the Occidentalist trope of conspiracy reduces the Westerner to a witless puppet manipulated by unseen hands (while simultaneously absolving the Occidentalist of any responsibility in his own political failures). Despite the enormity of the role played by conspiracy fantasies in the Eastern political imagination, there is only one full-length study of the issue in English: Pipes' *The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy* (1996).

Nadje Al-Ali may be quite right when she argues that these and other aspects of Occidentalism are "deeply informed" by an awareness of Western attitudes and constitute a response to them. But that is not their whole function. Like conspiracism, Occidentalism appears to play a scapegoating role for some, "explaining" Eastern political failure by positing a satanic foe and extending the revolutionary struggle against him, just as Orientalism played an exculpatory role justifying a brutal Western colonialism.

Occidentalism of this sort thus becomes quite useful, because the unavoidable fact is that Islamism has proved a failure. Far from establishing a benign, new relationship between rulers and people along traditional theological lines, political Islamism's most notable characteristic is repression. As the author Olivier Roy argued as long ago as 1992, the two models of Islamism from which to choose are the Saudi model of "revenue plus *sharia*" (the Islamic code of law) and the Sudanese model of "unemployment plus *sharia*." But Islamists cannot think that way and continue their struggle. Occidentalism provides part of that struggle's continuing justification.

In fact, the Orientalist critique may have played an indirect role as well. Islamism's failure is only the latest in a string of Eastern political failures that now extend over half a century. The East's own scholars have yet to confront this history in a sustained way. Rather, they have engaged in an Orientalist critique of their own, often drawing on the arguments of Western thinkers and blaming their problems on the West. Western scholars might ask themselves to what degree their work is less a critique of Western power than an enabler for Eastern failure.

One of the more interesting observations made in the wake of the murders is that "There isn't a single Islam: there are Islams, just as there are Americas." That is an invitation to ponder more carefully this global confrontation of values. Some Islams, perhaps like some Americas, offer the prospect of shaping identity through faith in a world of roiling choice. Others may invite the prospect of terror and blood. All parties burying their dead throughout the world would do well to consider the numerous dimensions of their struggle, and the numerous dimensions of their foe.

Who wrote of many Islams and many Americas? It was Edward Said, in his *Observer* essay. Would that he had said so to begin with.

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The New Cold War

American cultural identity after September 11

Nick Gillespie

"We have found our mission and our moment," declared President George W. Bush in his September 20 address to a joint session of Congress. In making such a statement, Bush was not simply outlining plans for what he originally called, in a Reaganesque turn of phrase, "a crusade against evil." (In another Reaganesque moment, Bush almost immediately recanted his original choice of words. Where Reagan apologized for calling the Soviet Union "evil," Bush, fearful of offending the Muslim governments with whom he wished to ally, apologized for invoking the Christian Crusades in preparing for battle against Islamic fundamentalists.)

Along with announcing what would ultimately become known as Operation Enduring Freedom, Bush ushered in an age of explicit national purpose—of an overarching political imperative to which everything else is subjugated—the likes of which hasn't been seen since the end of the Cold War. In doing so, the president was reacting to more than the horrific events of September 11. He was speaking to a long-simmering sense among many Americans that our society, at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union and international communism a decade ago, has become increasingly fragmented and incapable of pulling together for larger, ostensibly loftier, purposes than the supposedly crass individual pursuit of happiness.

Apart from important questions of military necessity, this is dangerous territory, as treacherous to traditional American ideals of liberty as the terrain in the mountains of Afghanistan is to invading armies. Indeed, at its best—which is not to say at its most typical—America has promised its citizens precisely a reprieve from such grand collective undertakings, substituting instead the right to live life as fully on one's own terms as possible.

Given the sacrifices that are inevitably demanded of citizens in wartime, it's worth puzzling over the implications of this latest call to arms—not necessarily to question its legitimacy, but to understand fully its potential pitfalls on the home front. The concern over national purpose took many forms in the decade after the Cold War, including a call from big-government conservatives for massive federal projects that would incarnate "American greatness" and a left-liberal demand for a reinvigorated communitarianism that would create a political agenda every bit as centralizing as the fight again communism had been.

The romance of national purpose has taken its most visible form in the celebration of the "greatest generation" and the overabundant World War II nostalgia that has given us a slew of films such as *Saving Private Ryan*, television programming such as the HBO series *Band of Brothers*, and a planned national monument in Washington, D.C., commemorating veterans of the Good War. It's hardly cynical to note that such nostalgia is directed less at the actual people who lived through the Great Depression and fought in World War II—most of whom are dead—and more at contemporary anxieties about lack of meaning.

Hence, Tom Brokaw, who popularized the "greatest generation" term, fixates more than anything on the contemporary need for belonging to something larger. Writing in the late 1990s, Brokaw duly, almost wistfully, noted the lack of any sort of national emergency akin to widespread economic panic or Axis aggression. Yet he insisted, "We must restore the World War II generation's sense of national purpose, not merely of individual needs." For Brokaw, these two aims are mutually exclusive; he simply can't conceive of a nation dedicated to allowing people to live their own lives.

The technical cost of starting a station has been within most Americans' reach for years. The legal cost, however, is much higher: thousands of dollars to purchase an existing license, thousands more to cross various regulatory hurdles. With very few exceptions, the FCC won't even issue licenses to noncommercial stations of less than 100 watts. Class A commercial stations require at least *6,000* watts of power.

Small wonder that so many people in the '90s chose to start their own micro radio stations—low-budget, low-power, locally focused outlets—without the sanction of the FCC.

Freedom to escape means being able to go beyond the conventional means of mediation and to interact more directly, more convivially, with others. It's not far from what the novelist Andrew Nelson Lytle had in mind when, in the '30s, he instructed his fellow Southerners to "throw out the radio and take down the fiddle from the wall." There have been times when doing free radio has meant evading the electromagnetic spectrum altogether, as with the Jamaican soundtracks that played music beloved in the island's poor communities but absent from the official airwaves; or the street DJs who invented hip-hop, mixing disks with a ferocious eclecticism that would have shocked even the most experimental freeform disc jockey of the hippie days.

Micro radio lets us speak for ourselves, lets us keep our »

ple to decide what is most important to them.

The War on Terrorism certainly delivers a national purpose. Bush has told us that we must gird ourselves for a long, drawn-out conflict in which all activities will be measured by their usefulness in combating terrorists of "global reach." "We will," he said, "direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network." When we are done with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, he promises, we will move on to the next group, stopping only when "every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." To succeed in "civilization's fight," Bush says, we must be willing to expand the scope of government action and sacrifice certain individual liberties in pursuit of our new national objective.

Ironically, Bush has defined the American national character in ways that confound demands for any sort of unified national purpose.

If this sounds like the Cold War, that's the point. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said, the War on Terrorism "undoubtedly will prove to be a lot more like a cold war than a hot war. If you think about it...the Cold War took 50 years, plus or minus....It involved continuous pressure....It involved the willingness of populations in many countries to invest in it and to sustain it."

In fact, the Cold War took more than a long time and many resources: It restructured every aspect of American society, becoming the center around which every activity revolved, whether it be sports, education, science, or popular culture. Especially in the Cold War's early years, every undertaking by an American—from piano recitals to chess matches to participating in the Olympics (themselves a product of an earlier iteration of nationalistic fervor following the Franco-Prussian War)—became an international struggle against the forces of communism.

However necessary such proxy battles may have been, they inevitably took a toll on traditional American identity by subjugating the individual to the state. As Arthur A. Ekirch Jr. noted in his regrettably forgotten 1955 masterpiece, *The Decline of American Liberalism*, the Cold War sanctioned both the growth of a military-industrial complex and intervention in all manner of economic and personal matters; tragically, the U.S. became something of a mirror of the Soviet Union in order to defeat it.

"As part of the struggle against Communism," wrote Ekirch, "the American people were won over to the necessity of military preparedness on a virtual wartime basis....The individual citizen...live[d] in a near-war atmosphere, in which his own aspirations were subordinated to the demands of the state."

Given the relatively limited size of its target, the War on Terrorism certainly won't demand the same level of resources or sacrifice that the Cold War did. Rather, it will function like a low-grade version of the Cold War. Still, virtually every significant decision in American political and cultural life will be judged in relation to it and prioritized accordingly. We've already seen the early fruits of this, with spending packages and other legislation hurried through Congress, requests from the government that media organizations put national interests ahead of disseminating news, and the shelving or delaying of movies and other pop culture fare. Some small measure of this may be unobjectionable, but if the War on Terrorism takes as long as the administration warns, it will become unbearably stultifying.

Ironically, only this much seems positive so far: In the very act of responding to the terrorist attacks, Bush has defined the American national character in ways that confound conservative and leftist demands for any sort of unified national purpose. In his September 20 address, Bush posed the rhetorical question, Why do the terrorists hate us? His answer, to be sure, was simplistic, but also carried a fair measure of truth: "They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other." In short, they hate our freedom to chart our own individual courses in life. One only hopes that insight doesn't become a casualty in the War on Terrorism.

Nick Gillespie (gillespie@reason.com) is **reason***'s editor-in-chief.*

Revolutionary Book

Did the vernacular Bible create individual liberty?

Mark Goldblatt

Wide as the Waters: The Story of the English Bible and the Revolution It Inspired, by Benson Bobrick, New York: Simon & Schuster, 379 pages, $26

IN A SENSE, to call the King James Bible a monumental achievement misses the mark. Monuments tend to stand apart from the things they celebrate. The King James Bible is, without question, a monument to the rhythmic power of the English language, but it also circumscribes the language itself, defining its linguistic and metaphoric possibilities—and thus the possibilities of how we think about ourselves and our place in the world. It is at once a cornerstone and a keystone, the prosaic base of our legal codes and the poetic altitude of our cultural aspirations. If its cadences were not by now ingrained in the mental breathing of every fluent speaker of English, you, the reader, would not sense the necessity of the period I am about to type.

Benson Bobrick's *Wide as the Waters* is, first and foremost, a highly readable account of how the English Bible came to be, from its genesis in the pre-Reformation intuitions of John Wycliffe in the late 1300s to its consummation during the reign of King James I in the early 1600s. More broadly, however, Bobrick argues that the appearance of the English Bible quickened "the development of the vernacular" and led, eventually, to "the origin of a culture belonging to the masses...that expressed the popular will." The ascendancy of democracy in the West, according to Bobrick, should be understood as an inevitable consequence of the historical movement to translate the Bible from the Church-sanctioned Latin of St. Jerome into the spoken languages of Europe. This isn't as original a thesis as Bobrick seems to think it is. Still, he brings considerable storytelling skills to the writing, and he has produced a history of substance and value.

It was the Englishman Wycliffe who, more than a century before the German Martin Luther, began churning out a series of polemical treatises raising the theological issues that would eventually coalesce into the Protestant Reformation. In these tracts, mostly written between 1378 and 1380, Wycliffe took up such volatile matters as the literal truth and sufficiency of the Scriptures, the nature of the eucharistic Presence, and the extent of papal power. Wycliffe was drawn especially to the Augustinian doctrine of predestination—the notion that people's souls were ticketed to heaven or hell regardless of their actions—and the corollary distinction between the visible Church, comprising all who proclaim themselves Christians, and the invisible Church, comprising an Elect who are actually predestined for salvation. Wycliffe's reasoning was straightforward enough: In the first place, God's omniscience implied that he foreknew the outcome of individual lives in advance of their being lived; in the second place, Jesus' sacrifice on the cross had been sufficient and complete and didn't need to be supplemented by human works. What was asked of the Christian was simply faith, itself an unmerited gift from God, and at the root of that faith was the Bible—which, like Jesus' sacrifice, was also sufficient and complete.

Rome, naturally, saw things quite differently—and declared Wycliffe's writings heretical. A 1,000-year tradition had established the Catholic Church's function as intermediary between the individual and God. The collective wisdom of Catholicism, embodied in the inspired judgments of its Church councils, was regarded as equal in authority to the Scriptures themselves. Of the seven Catholic sacraments, for example, only two—baptism and the Eucharist—could

radios on *and* take down those fiddles from the wall. By blurring the boundaries between mass media and face-to-face interaction, it puts the former at the disposal of the latter. A micro station based in a particular community—a housing project, a rural village, a bar, a church, a group of friends—isn't just a signal a solitary listener might catch on his stereo. It's a rallying point, a reason for people to gather both on and off the air.

In the early days of Steal This Radio, a pirate station in New York City, the broadcasters constantly moved from one location to another—"solemnly vigilant," an organizer later wrote, "against FCC detection." *Solemnly* might not be the best word for the station. "Our weekly broadcasts quickly became the best floating party on the Lower East Side, and as thirty or forty people would inevitably arrive at every broadcast location, we often asked ourselves if anyone was home listening to the show."

And if they weren't, would it matter? ▮

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

claim unambiguous scriptural precedent. The other five—confirmation, confession and penance, ordination, marriage, and anointing the sick—emerged through conciliar deliberations in the course of Church history.

What especially got under Wycliffe's skin, as it would Luther's, was the practice of selling "indulgences." The theory behind indulgences, as Bobrick explains, began with the premise that the saints canonized by the Church always accumulated more spiritual merits than were needed for their own salvations; their "excess credits" were thus "stored in a celestial deposit box" upon which the Pope was able to "draw and make transfers" to augment the merits of whoever happened to be lacking (and willing to pay, of course). Clearly, this practice had no unambiguous scriptural precedent; its sole justification seemed to be the authority of the Church.

For Wycliffe, that wasn't enough: "Were there a hundred popes...their opinions in matters of faith should not be accepted except in so far as they are founded on Scripture itself." The Bible was therefore the key; if the common man could get at it, could make sense of it himself, the intermediary function of the Church would be rendered moot. Thus, he and a group of his Oxford cohorts set about translating the Bible into English.

Wycliffe's efforts at Christian reform are a textbook case of having the right idea at the wrong time. The appearance of an English Bible seems, in retrospect, inevitable. It seemed less so in the late 1300s, if only for the simple reason that not many people knew how to read. (Gutenberg didn't develop his printing press until 1455, so there wasn't much to read even if you knew how.) Nor was the intermediary role of the Church viewed by the common folk of England as particularly objectionable. The Latin mass they attended must have seemed otherworldly indeed, the priest imbued with strange occult powers, striding across the sanctuary, uttering deep, sonorous syllables and eliciting unthinking responses, building toward a climax in which the Host was raised high and then mysteriously altered by the sacred words "Hoc est corpus" ("Here is His body"). It was that very phrase which, centuries later, in a more anti-Roman climate, would be garbled into "hocus pocus"—meaning a cheap bit of theatrical magic.

Though he did affect the first English versions of the full Old and New Testaments, Wycliffe actually made little headway in his struggle to reform the English Church. It was still Catholic and wholly answerable to Rome when he died of natural causes in 1384. Wycliffe's spiritual successor, William Tyndale, would raise an even greater ruckus by producing an even more influential translation of the Bible. (Tyndale would also suffer in direct proportion to his accomplishments.) Tyndale lived in the era of Luther; translations of the Bible into the vernaculars of Europe, including Luther's own German rendition, were already in progress. More critically, the printing press had been brought to England by William Caxton in 1476. Literacy rates were soaring. Demand for an English Bible was welling among the people themselves.

Unfortunately for Tyndale, while he was pondering his translation of the New Testament, King Henry

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

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

VIII was still currying favor with Rome. He had reason, as an absolute monarch, to regard uneasily the egalitarian sentiments implicit in the notion of universal access to the Bible—and thus every man's responsibility for his own salvation. Though Tyndale fled England before actually beginning his work, he was hounded by royal agents throughout the project, viciously slandered by Henry's lord chancellor Thomas More (who comes off here as somewhat less than a Man For All Seasons) and, finally, arrested and imprisoned outside of Brussels at the king's behest. There, Tyndale spent his last year translating the Old Testament. He was executed —strangled and then burned—in 1536.

Ironically, by the time of Tyndale's death, Henry's desire for a divorce had precipitated his renunciation of papal authority. The Church of England was officially severed from Rome in 1534, and Tyndale's English Bibles flooded into the country. More translations followed, some with a radical Protestant slant, some with a reactionary Catholic slant, and these versions fell in and out of favor as the English monarchy itself lurched back and forth between the polarities. Stability of a sort came with the accession of Elizabeth in 1559, who enforced a middle way, or *via media,* between the two—a settlement that was mostly Protestant in doctrine but mostly Catholic in practice. The "Virgin Queen" bore no heirs, but she hand-picked her cousin, James VI of Scotland, as her successor. James was the son of Elizabeth's former rival, the Catholic Mary Queen of Scots, but he'd been raised a Presbyterian Calvinist; both sides therefore had reasons to embrace and to suspect him. That he more or less maintained Elizabeth's status quo is as much attributable to the economic prosperity and international calm of her last years as to his personal convictions. He had no desire, on the one hand, to cede power back to Rome, or, on the other hand, to undo the Episcopal order which set him at the head of the English Church. It was James who commissioned what would become known as the Authorized Version of 1611—or, more familiarly, the King James Bible.

It's a fascinating story Bobrick tells, full of intrigue and betrayal, a reminder of a time when men went to their graves for holding theological opinions on matters as arcane as the nature of the divine presence in the Eucharist. For the most part, Bobrick does an admirable job with the material; he is especially good on the evolution of the Biblical text itself, demonstrating how slight shadings in word choices colored the meaning of entire verses.

The broader thesis of *Wide as the Waters* —that the rise of democracy in Western Europe should be viewed as a natural consequence of the appearance of vernacular Bibles and of the spirit of the Reformation in general—is entirely

plausible, if not quite earth-shattering news. Max Weber made much the same point in a broader way a century ago in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Bobrick narrows down the terms a bit; for "the Protestant Ethic," he's substituting the primacy placed on individual conscience that followed from every man's access to the Scriptures, and for "the Spirit of Capitalism," he's substituting the democratic institutions in which capitalism thrives.

To be sure, Henry VIII proved correct in his suspicions of the anti-monarchical implications of every man's custodianship of his own soul. The spread of English Bibles carried with it the notion of a spiritual democracy; in the political realm, this translated, in Bobrick's words, into "the right and capacity of the people to think for themselves." When James' successor, Charles I, attempted to reassert the absolute power of the throne and to quell parliamentary debate—in effect, silencing the voice of the people—he ran afoul of this movement, precipitating a civil war. It was a war, first and foremost, of king vs. parliament; yet it was also a war over how to read the Bible: "The powers that be are ordained of God" (Romans 13:1) vs. "We ought rather to obey God than men" (Acts 5:29). Charles insisted upon his divine right to rule while the people insisted that their collective voice, guided by their individual consciences, was God's own voice. Charles' reign ended in 1649, with his beheading.

> The Latin mass they attended must have seemed otherworldly indeed, the priest imbued with strange occult powers, striding across the sanctuary.

The Commonwealth that followed, led initially by Oliver Cromwell and then by his son Richard, lasted only until 1660, but afterward the restored monarchy of Charles II was significantly constrained by Parliament. When James II succeeded Charles II and again made gestures toward autocratic rule, he was overthrown in the bloodless "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 and William of Orange raised up in his stead. William wisely would not accept the throne until he was recognized as legitimate king by Parliament. Thus, England became a constitutional monarchy.

Bobrick recounts these events in a concise and decidedly jargon-free way. This is certainly a blessing. Still, two faults of *Wide as the Waters* must be mentioned. The first is Bobrick's abominable method of citation. Significant quotes are introduced with phrases such as "as one scholar put it" or "as one prominent Puritan told his brethren," and the reader is then forced to flip to the back of the book to determine the identity of the speaker. What is the possible rationale for omitting the name on the page itself?

The second fault is perhaps more a reflection of my academic predilections than a definitive strike against the book. Still, my gut tells me that historians, of all people, should not rely too heavily on secondary sources. More than half of Bobrick's bibliographic citations begin with the words: "Quoted in..." If you're going to write a scholarly book, even if it's intended for laymen, why not make the effort to track down primary materials, especially given the possible distortion that creeps in at every iteration? And if secondary sources are occasionally forgivable symptoms of authorial sloth, tertiary sources strike me as something worse. The fact that Bobrick cites the *Encyclopedia Britannica* on a regular basis gives the book—despite its considerable merits—the slightly unpleasant aftertaste of an undergraduate term paper.

These are quibbles, however. Bobrick has written a fine, readable study on an important subject.

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

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Lobotomies, Socialist and Capitalist

A gossipy journey from left to right.

Jesse Walker

Commies: A Journey Through the Old Left, the New Left and the Leftover Left, by Ronald Radosh, San Francisco: Encounter Books, 216 pages, $24.95

RONALD RADOSH IS AN academic historian, author of several respectable (if not always respected) books on the critics, allies, and enemies of American foreign policy. He is also a former leftist who has joined the political right. The second description, in itself, tells us little: There are many lefts and many rights, especially now that the events of 1989 have turned the political spectrum into a Jackson Pollock painting. Once the world gets turned upside down, you never know where the people who once sat securely atop it will fall.

Those interested in the myriad political journeys American intellectuals have taken should be interested in *Commies*, Radosh's memoir of his path across and out of the radical left. As a case study, it's invaluable: an exemplary text as notable for what it skirts over as it is for what it says.

It's also less academic than one might expect from a book by a scholarly historian. *Commies* is crammed not with pedantic footnotes but with gossip, much of it gratuitous and most of it highly entertaining. Here we are told that Mary Travers (the feminine third of Peter, Paul, and Mary) displayed a "precocious sexuality" at Elisabeth Irwin High School, which she attended with Radosh; that Bianca Jagger may have had an affair with the Sandinista commandante Tomas Borge; that at the first wedding of Michael Lerner, later to invent Hillary Clinton's "politics of meaning," the cake bore the slogan "Smash Monogamy." Bob Dylan has a cameo, as do Henry Wallace, Pete Seeger, a dope-dealing descendent of Wendell Willkie, and Barbara Garson, author of the delightfully libelous LBJ-bashing play *Macbird*, who by Radosh's account climbed into bed with him 15 minutes after they met.

In a book stuffed with embarrassing anecdotes, my favorite involves Robert Scheer, a former editor of the New Left magazine *Ramparts*, who now appears in such reputable outlets as the *Los Angeles Times* and National Public Radio. In the early '70s, Radosh claims, he attempted to interview Scheer for the Pacifica radio network, only to find that the man "would talk on the record about only one topic—the only one that mattered—the realization of the socialist utopia in Kim Il Sung's North Korea." According to Radosh, the discussion lasted more than two hours, yet never strayed far from Scheer's hobbyhorse; the results proved too weird for even the famously tolerant Pacifica to play.

How much of all this scuttlebutt is actually true? I have no idea. I e-mailed Scheer to ask for his side of the story; he replied that he remembered no such interview, that he has to "wonder why there is no written record of my having said anything like that," and that he never regarded North Korean communism as an ideal. Others have issued similar denials and semi-denials of Radosh's stories, leaving future historians with a mess of contradictory accounts to sort through. Like all good gossip, Radosh's tales come with the faint suspicion that you're being had.

Weaving through all this tittle-tattle is a narrative. In just over 200 pages, we watch a young Stalinist evolve into a New Leftist, into a social democrat, and, finally, into a member of David Horowitz's circle of fiercely repentant refugees from radicalism.

Here's the tale in brief. Radosh was born in the late '30s to a pair of immigrant radicals, both of them sympathetic to the Soviet Union. He went to a socialist summer camp and to a private high school, the latter a refuge for teachers who had refused to sign the public schools' loyalty oath or to cooperate with the House Committee on Un-American Activities. As a teenager, Radosh joined the Labor Youth League, sort of a junior wing of the Communist Party; he became a full-fledged member of the party as an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin.

Radosh's portrait of life as a young Red is engagingly written, filled with vivid characters (such as his mother's cousin Jacob Abrams, a Bolshevik-hating anarchist exiled to Mexico City) and enjoyably odd details (such as the teacher who tried to relate everything he taught to dialectical materialism—including geology). Refreshingly, he is generally able to criticize the Stalinist subculture in which he was raised without defending McCarthyism and its excrescences.

Returning to Wisconsin for graduate school in 1961, Radosh studied under the historian William Appleman Williams, a non-Communist radical in the American populist tradition. He grew disillusioned with orthodox Marxism, adopting first the pro-Soviet but anti-Stalinist views of Isaac Deutscher, and then a more eclectic New Left socialism. In the '70s, Radosh and some comrades »

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Behind the triumph of erotica

Nick Gillespie

ONE OF THE MOST complete victories in the fight for free expression has also been one of the least heralded: We now live in a world of ubiquitous and infinitely varied pornography. Forty years ago, porn—however defined—was not only relatively tough to find, it was relatively homogenous and restrained in its manifestations.

Not so anymore. As *The Wall Street Journal*'s "Business World" columnist, Holman W. Jenkins Jr., fretted in the conservative journal *Policy Review* earlier this year, we've witnessed nothing short of a "revolution in the availability of pornography" over the past few decades. "Porn has moved out of a few segregated public spaces, the seedy book shops and triple-X theaters, and become ubiquitous on the web, on cable, in neighborhood video shops."

uring the 1970s and '80s, battles over the spread and the effects of porn were the stuff of headlines. By the end of the '90s, porn had become less a perennial controversy than a big business, grossing between $5 billion and $8 billion annually. Paradoxically, porn is more available than ever, yet less of a public issue.

Why? Perhaps most important, technological developments—especially the VCR and the Internet—increasingly allow porn to be consumed in private settings, rendering most battles over the location of the local Pussycat Theatre obsolete. Then there's what gets described alternately as the ongoing liberation or vulgarization of American culture. Reflecting rising levels of education and standards of living, the sexual revolution and other antinomian trends, our society has become far more tolerant of all sorts of activity and behavior once considered deviant or simply unseemly. (One meaningful exception to this general tolerance is child pornography, which continues to generate the outrage and condemnation it deserves.)

With regards to erotica, the result might be called John Stuart Mill's wet dream, combining the philosopher's penchant for "experiments in living" with his defense of a maximized private sphere in which consenting adults are mostly free to do as they please.

The Government vs. Erotica: The Siege of Adam & Eve (Prometheus Books), fleshes out another important contributing factor to the porn revolution: legal battles over the right to sell sexually explicit materials. Harvey is the head of the family planning organization DKT International, and an avid supporter of libertarian causes ranging from free speech to drug legalization. (He has also donated to the Reason Foundation, the nonprofit that publishes this magazine.) More to the point, Harvey is the owner of Adam & Eve, a North Carolina–based company that sells sex toys, adult videos, and contraceptives through the mail and over the Web.

In 1986, Adam & Eve was invaded by law enforcement officials on the hunt for "obscene" materials. Thus began an eight-year battle, in which Harvey fought the federal government for the right to sell dirty movies, condoms, and other sexual aids to willing adults. After winning an obscenity trial in conservative Alamance County (during which prosecutors made a show of entering into evidence a "foot-long double dong" sold by Adam & Eve), Harvey found himself up against the U.S. Department of Justice under Attorney General Edwin Meese.

The Meese DOJ pursued a nationwide strategy, "Project Postporn," in which it filed simultaneous, multiple-district prosecutions against porn sellers. The goal—often successful—was to scare vendors into quickly accepting draconian settlements that allowed them to avoid or reduce jail time by shuttering their doors. Harvey took a different tack: He fought the federal obscenity charges (eventually spending some $3 million on legal fees), and brought a civil suit against the feds, ultimately settling all matters largely on his terms.

he Government vs. Erotica charts Harvey's struggle in a consistently intriguing and readable fashion, mixing legal documents and memos with the author's own account. It is a chilling tale, one of state repression and overreach. But it's also one with a happy ending, not just for porn consumers but for all supporters of free expression. "The U.S. obscenity laws under which we were prosecuted are still in place, strong, vague, and...enforceable in differing and frequently unjust ways," writes Harvey. Nonetheless, his struggle, including the court battles, "indictments in two states, a trial in one, and...a lawsuit ...against the U.S. Department of Justice...led to a significant victory for the right of Americans to read and to see the forms of entertainment that they wish to read and to see."

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› tried to launch a radical third party, and when that failed he joined the Democratic Socialists of America, a group aimed at pushing the Democratic Party to the left.

He also found himself increasingly alienated from the radical milieu. In the late '70s, after more than a decade of work criticizing U.S. foreign policy, Radosh started writing about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, two Communists executed in 1953 for stealing nuclear secrets. For the Old Left—including the young Radosh—the Rosenbergs had been martyrs, victims of the same National Security State that had given the country loyalty oaths and Joe McCarthy. Radosh launched his investigations expecting to conclude that the couple was innocent. Instead, he uncovered a different story: Julius Rosenberg really was guilty, and Ethel was probably an accessory to the crime.

"We have to understand," a revolutionary loyalist explained, "that there are differences between capitalist lobotomies and socialist lobotomies."

To be sure, the new account—showcased most prominently in *The Rosenberg File* (1983)—didn't make the American authorities look much better. Ethel had played, at worst, a minor role in the affair, but she still faced the death penalty. Why? Because the government thought that would pressure Julius to confess. Furthermore, the pair was put to death under a law intended only to execute those who committed espionage for a wartime enemy. Yet the spying had taken place during World War II, when the Soviet Union was still an ally. So why were they killed rather than imprisoned? To make a political point.

That may sound like useful fodder for the anti-anti-Communists, but it was small comfort for those with an emotional investment in the innocence of the Rosenbergs. Nor did it please those who liked to believe that Soviet espionage was a myth and that the only crimes of the Cold War were committed by the West. Radosh was fiercely attacked, and even some figures who privately sympathized with his views were too cowed to defend him publicly. (Michael Harrington, founder of the Democratic Socialists of America, allegedly told Radosh that he "always knew" the Rosenbergs were guilty, "but we're trying to get former Communists who have left the party but are still pro-Soviet into our organization and I can't do anything to alienate them.")

Meanwhile, Radosh was having second thoughts about another leftist shibboleth: the revolutionary government in Nicaragua. He traveled there several times during the '80s, discovered that the Sandinistas were repressive, and stopped supporting their regime. At first he balanced his critique of the Sandinistas with criticisms of the U.S.-backed contra rebels. Then he convinced himself that the contras had evolved into a genuinely popular movement, and endorsed them outright. With this, he managed to estrange himself from those leftists too young to care about the Rosenbergs.

By 1993, the onetime radical was conservative enough to take a six-month job with the United States Information Agency. These days, among other projects, he writes regularly for David Horowitz's *Heterodoxy* and *Frontpage*.

Yet Radosh's first friendly contacts with the right did not come in the '80s or '90s. They came in the '60s, when the group around the journal *Studies on the Left*, which included Radosh, pioneered the idea of "corporate liberalism." This was the notion that, as Radosh puts it here, "the dominant worldview of American political leaders was not one of laissez faire, but rather a managerial form of liberalism." In its "cruder form," Radosh continues, the theory "was used to argue that in the United States, the true enemy of the left was not the 'reactionaries,' i.e. old-style Republicans and conservatives, but rather the liberals who comprised what they liked to call the 'vital center.'"

This stance allowed a certain measure of cooperation between the *Studies* leftists and Murray Rothbard's circle of isolationist libertarians. Rothbard contributed to *Studies on the Left*, and in 1967, Radosh in turn contributed to Rothbard's *Left and Right*. In 1972, the two co-edited *A New History of Leviathan*, with contributions from both sides of the anti-liberal aisle; three years later, Radosh published *Prophets on the Right*, a sympathetic study of the conservative critics of American imperialism.

Virtually all of this is missing from *Commies*. Perhaps Radosh felt he did not know enough gossip about the libertarians to include them. More likely, it would have unduly complicated his conversion narrative to acknowledge the existence of anti-imperialists outside the left.

It is such carefully obscured complications that make this book worth reading, even after the gossip has

been absorbed or forgotten. At times, *Commies* seems less interesting for its insights than for those moments when insight suddenly, intriguingly disappears.

Consider Radosh's adventures in Nicaragua. This was not the first socialist regime in Latin America that Radosh visited: In the mid-'70s, he tells us, he and some other leftists toured Cuba. He entered the island expecting to find a vibrant social model; he left it with a considerable collection of doubts. The defining moment of his trip came after a tour of a Cuban madhouse, where a doctor had bragged that "in our institution, we have a larger proportion of hospital inmates who have been lobotomized than any other mental hospital in the world." Most of the tour group was horrified, but a revolutionary loyalist stood up for the asylum. "We have to understand," she explained, "that there are differences between capitalist lobotomies and socialist lobotomies."

Radosh wrote about his doubts in the pacifist magazine *Liberation*, prompting a horde of hostile letters. But he remained a supporter, albeit a critical one, of the Cuban regime, and he did not sever his ties with the left. The Sandinistas were autocrats, but they were never as oppressive as Castro. So why did they prompt the ideological shift that Cuba didn't?

The answer may have something to do with the intervening contretemps over the Rosenbergs: It's harder to feel loyal to a movement when large segments of it are already attempting to excommunicate you. But Radosh did not merely attack the Sandinistas. He supported U.S. aid to the contras. A man who for his entire life opposed American intervention abroad—a leftist who had found more to admire in the isolationist critics of World War II than in its socialist supporters—was now calling for military action against a sovereign country. This clearly represents more than disillusionment with Third World revolution or left-wing groupthink. It's a fundamental shift in a political worldview. Yet Radosh never explains what provoked it.

Meanwhile, he attacks anyone on the left who disagreed with his take on Nicaragua—even where the actual disagreement is hard to discern. He thus writes with considerable venom about Paul Berman, a lefty journalist who, Radosh claims, refused to criticize the Sandinistas when Radosh urged him to. "Eventually," Radosh adds, "Paul Berman would become something of a critic of the Sandinistas, and would use this as proof of how he exemplified a truly independent and critical left wing. But his tepid criticism would be too little and too late, coming after it could do any good." The problem: Radosh says he asked Berman to criticize the Sandinistas in 1987. That's a year after the latter published a much-debated article in *Mother Jones* that, er, criticized the Sandinistas. Just when exactly is "too late"?

Radosh never mentions the *Mother Jones* article, nor Berman's earlier criticisms of the Sandinistas in *The Village Voice*. One gets the impression that Radosh didn't merely want people on the left to attack the Sandinistas; he wanted them to adopt his own critique, including his support for the contras. (Of course, one needn't even be a leftist to oppose contra aid. Conservatives as well as leftists can wonder why the U.S. should meddle in another nation's affairs; conservatives as well as leftists can object to contra atrocities.) Perhaps there is more to Radosh's unkind words than he is letting on, a personal reason for his attacks on Berman (who himself has evolved from an anarchist into a social democrat, a supporter of "humanitarian" wars, and a voter for Al Gore). Or perhaps Radosh became as narrow-minded in his pursuit of a contra victory as his erstwhile comrades had been in their defense of Soviet spies and socialist lobotomies. Either way, he sometimes sounds as rigid as the left he abandoned.

Commies is, at its best, a study of the mind-numbing effect of dogma, of the ridiculous things people can bring themselves to do or think because of the intellectual systems they subscribe to. It is also a study of how loyalties—personal, political, social—can disguise themselves as ideology, with similarly deranging effects. In a quieter way, it shows how a man perspicacious enough to see these faults in his former comrades can fail to see them still lurking within himself.

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Amateur Hour

Jesse Walker

A TIDAL WAVE OF DEBRIS rolls toward the camera. Suddenly, the screen goes completely black; the terrified cameraman whispers, "I hope I live, I hope I live." When the darkness clears, we're in an eerie, chaotic landscape, like a Sam Fuller war movie crossed with *Night of the Living Dead*.

The scene, of course, is Manhattan, September 11, 2001. The cameraman is Mark Heath, a doctor who rushed to the World Trade Center after the terrorist attacks, only to narrowly miss dying himself when one of the towers collapsed. Heath habitually brings a camera with him when responding to an emergency, to document the scene for future reference. That day, he captured the most staggering footage to emerge from the terror.

Amid the often awful television coverage of the September 11 atrocities—the soaring Muzak, gauzy montages, and newscaster clichés that threatened to trivialize the worst crime ever committed on U.S. soil—there was this gritty amateur footage, these harsh and immediate images. Heath's video quickly turned up on TV and the Web, along with many other sequences shot by non-professionals. If life, as *The Onion* argues, has begun to imitate a bad Jerry Bruckheimer movie, it is this far different, far more democratic sort of moving picture that captures the real horror of our world.



Wind for Sale

Laura E. Huggins is a public affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution.

In the 1850s Chief Seattle suggested that the wind could never be sold. But Seattle never witnessed the new economy. Wind rights are now for sale and they're going fast. Brokers are offering cash to farmers who are willing to plant a crop of wind turbines, and farmers are discovering that investing in wind power can be more profitable than raising traditional crops. In Minnesota, for example, a typical annual harvest nets $40 an acre; a single wind turbine, which takes up about one-eighth of an acre, generates about $2,000 in a year.

Turning wind into power is nothing new. Europeans have been using windmills since the 1500s. Windmills were also used throughout the American West in the early 1900s until the arrival of rural electrification. Modern windmills are once again sprouting up across the United States as wind farms become a viable option for utility companies struggling to meet high demands in the face of rising oil and gas prices.

Much of the growth in wind-produced energy is due to the development of more efficient turbines, making wind power competitive with other energy sources—and more than just a green power fad. Today's turbines have sophisticated sensors and blades that are able to rotate and change direction automatically to capture the most wind. A modern 1.5-megawatt turbine can produce electricity for 3 to 4 cents a kilowatt-hour, which is comparable to coal-fired plants, according to a recent analysis by Stanford University engineers.

In addition to being cost-effective, turbines are environmentally friendly. Wind power produces no air pollution. It does not threaten the earth's climate. It does not deplete our natural resources, and no land must be strip-mined to extract wind.

With capacity expected to double in the next year, wind is the nation's fastest-growing source of electricity. According to studies by the Earth Policy Institute, Texas, Kansas, and North Dakota combined have enough wind potential to generate electricity for the entire United States.

But what happens when the wind stops? Until a storage mechanism can be created, utilities are forced to rely on backup power sources. Another obstacle facing wind power is a shortage of adequate transmission lines—a key component in getting energy from rural areas to population centers. New technologies, however, such as the development of compressed-air energy storage and high-voltage transmission lines, are being advanced to overcome these hurdles and help eliminate energy shortages.

Large companies are eager to harness the wind. Shell Oil, for example, recently bought its first wind farm in Wyoming. Landowners are also eager to collect wind royalties—especially farmers who can continue to farm with turbines on their property. As Pat Wood, President Bush's appointee to the Federal Energy Regulation Commission, observed, **"We've got lots of wind and it's about time that people figured out a way to make some money off it."**

Energy policy for the twenty-first century should take into account emerging technological advances in wind power and other alternative energy sources. If wind power is cleaner than and as cheap as coal-fired power plants, then perhaps the answer to our energy crisis is blowing in the wind.

— Laura E. Huggins

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